Trade.io
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Although the removed tokens in this case were created specifically for the company behind the exchange, and the situation was resolved through a hard fork, this hack could theoretically have happened to any other token. It seems fairly obvious that the cold wallet key was compromised during their generation sequence, and since the wallet only had one key, this enabled access to spend the funds in the future. It is therefore not enough to simply have a cold wallet and store funds securely offline. It must require multiple signatures. ERC20 does not presently offer a built-in multi-signature method, and therefore this is only possible with coins like bitcoin. Going with the theory that one of the team members went rogue and copied the private key during its generation, this would be solved by a proper multi-sig wallet where each team member independently and securely generates their own key, and the keys of multiple team members are required to move the funds.
This exchange or platform is based in Switzerland, or the incident targeted people primarily in Switzerland.[1][2][3]
About Trade.io
“The goal of the Zug-based company is to open a multi-asset decentralised exchange which handles cryptocurrency, fiat currency, and financial derivatives based on physical commodities.” “Trade.io, a Swiss blockchain company that advertises itself as a “next-generation financial institution”, has been hacked. According to an announcement from the firm, 50 million Trade Tokens (TIO), which is the company’s own cryptocurrency, have been stolen. These are worth approximately $7.5 million at the current price, but closer to $11 million at the time of the hack a few hours ago.” “The stolen tokens were intended to be used as a project’s liquidity pool. Therefore, the management performed a fork to get the funds back. Interestingly enough the team stored the wallet itself in a local bank’s deposit safe. And since it was reported that the safe wasn’t compromised the only explanation is that hackers somehow managed to access the wallet details for making the transfers, that normally indicates an “inside job”.” “Trade.io states: “We use industry recommended cold storage which are maintained in safety deposit boxes in banks, along with all corresponding materials. We have confirmed that the safety deposit boxes were not compromised.””
This exchange or platform is based in Switzerland, or the incident targeted people primarily in Switzerland.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| October 1st, 2018 12:01:08 AM MDT | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $8,000,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
General Prevention Policies
Coming soon.
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ The Biggest Cryptocurrency Hacks of 2018 (A Year in Which $1 Billion Crypto Was Stolen) (Feb 26, 2020)
- ↑ Hack! Trade.io Loses 50 Million TIO Tokens from Cold Wallet | Finance Magnates (Feb 27, 2020)
- ↑ SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone (Jun 26, 2021)