TokenStore Ponzi Scheme Rug Pull

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Limited information appears about the TokenStore ponzi scheme, which supposedly claimed $160,000,000 USD when it collapsed in June 10th, 2019. While the security firm Peckshield was involved with tracking down the funds, there is limited evidence that any funds were recovered.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About TokenStore

"Some of the victims responded to the main head of the TokenStore , “Niu Niu”, which has a case on the Internet in China. This shows that it has previously participated in similar “financial fraud”. At a time when P2P is under strong supervision, these people have moved fraudulent means to the field of cryptocurrency. The same formula, the same taste , using the cognitive blind spots that people are eager for wealth but can't understand the blockchain, re-implement fraud."

"The TokenStore wallet stipulates a withdrawal fee of 5% within 30 days and a withdrawal fee of 1% after 30 days. This is not only inconsistent with the transaction logic of the blockchain, but also clearly means that the project party intends to reduce your frequent withdrawals."

"[S]uch a project with the nature of a Ponzi scheme will have a thunderous day sooner or later. The PeckShield security team has exposed dozens of similar financial wallet scams including PlusToken, TokenStore, EOS ecosystem, etc., which all confirm this."

"From June 10th, the wealth management wallet TokenStore was suspected of running, and within the scope of statistics, at least thousands of users involved in hundreds of millions of assets were taken away. PeckShield has initially tracked the flow of some assets such as EOS, ETH, ETC, and USDT in the previous article "Text Tracking TokenStore "Running Road Assets Money Laundering (1)" ."

"Every step of the road assets affects the hearts of investors. PeckShield Digital Asset Escrow (AML) has been continuously tracking addresses on critical chains that involve “running”. Recently, PeckShield security personnel further analyzed that the ETH part of these digital assets has undergone a lot of money laundering operations, of which 10,756 ETHs have flowed into the exchange, and the EOS, USDT and other currencies have not yet had abnormal movements."

"As of 2019-06-28, 38,283 ETH has 10,756 flows to the exchange, and the remaining 27,527 ETH is temporarily stored in 27 addresses." "As of [July 11th], the cryptocurrency of the TokenStore running assets flowing into the exchange has been monitored for a total value of $8.7 million. Regarding the flow of more running assets, PeckShield security personnel will continue to follow up on the monitoring and disclose details in subsequent articles."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - TokenStore Ponzi Scheme Rug Pull

Date	Event	Description
June 10th, 2019	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $160,000,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

Multiple respected blockchain entities exist outside of any oversight, in offshore jurisdictions. This is a situation which is fundamental to the blockchain being a global system, however it has also been increased through regulatory overhead, lack of clarity, and ongoing cost required to establish and maintain regulatory compliance, which often precludes innovative firms from even applying. Many countries that have strong foundations in blockchain technology have leading firms leave the country and establish offshore. At the same time, the general public doesn't understand how any of these regulations work to protect them, and following the stringent advice of sticking to purely regulated products is unlikely to be the norm among seasoned blockchain users.

A framework with transparent and public reports for exchanges and innovative technologies (including a verification of full backing of customer funds) would introduce an expectation of this information existing, and make a ponzi scheme stand out. Most existing audits are revenue-focused and have inadequate information in this regard. (For example, no breakdown of crypto asset liabilities.) When regulations are affordable for small platforms and simple enough for the general public to understand, reputable platforms will be less likely to choose to operate from offshore jurisdictions. Frameworks that maintain power in the hands of platforms, industry, and the community, are less likely to create conflict with innovation. An open-ended and decentralized, community-run insurance fund is one of few structures which could actually step in to assist victims of unregistered ponzis.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.