SuperRare updateMerkleRoot Backwards Permission Check Logic

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SuperRare Logo/Homepage

SuperRare, a high-end digital art marketplace known for its curated one-of-one crypto artworks and artist-centric community, recently suffered a critical exploit in its RareStakingV1 smart contract. A flaw in the access control logic of the updateMerkleRoot function allowed unauthorized users—excluding only the intended privileged addresses—to update staking reward eligibility. This oversight enabled an attacker to submit a forged Merkle root and claim roughly 11.9 million $RARE tokens (~$730K). A frontrunning incident followed, likely involving MEV strategies. The attacker’s address had been funded via Tornado Cash months prior, suggesting premeditation. Despite widespread third-party reporting, SuperRare has not publicly acknowledged the breach, and no recovery efforts have been disclosed. The incident underscores how a minor code logic error in decentralized protocols can lead to substantial financial loss.

About SuperRare

SuperRare is a pioneering digital art marketplace and gallery that specializes in one-of-one crypto artworks. Launched in 2018, it offers a curated platform where artists mint, exhibit, and sell NFTs (non-fungible tokens) directly to collectors. Unlike open marketplaces with mass uploads, SuperRare takes a high-end, gallery-style approach, emphasizing quality, originality, and digital scarcity. Each artwork is tokenized on the Ethereum blockchain, ensuring transparent ownership, provenance, and resale royalties for artists.

The platform distinguishes itself by fostering a strong community of collectors and creators through artist onboarding, editorial features, and physical exhibitions. It also integrates social features like profiles, bidding, and commenting to encourage collector-artist interactions. SuperRare recently launched SuperRare Spaces—independently curated storefronts that bring decentralized governance into the platform. These Spaces are selected and managed by community members who propose exhibitions, onboard artists, and earn a portion of sales, aligning with the DAO’s long-term vision.

Governance and development of SuperRare are overseen by RareDAO, a decentralized autonomous organization powered by the $RARE token. Holders of $RARE can participate in protocol decisions, manage treasury funds, and vote on key initiatives, including Space proposals. With notable partners like Sotheby’s and artists such as XCOPY and Beeple commanding multimillion-dollar sales, SuperRare remains at the forefront of the crypto art movement, merging high-end digital art with decentralized technology.

The Reality

Unfortunately, the SuperRare staking contract (RareStakingV1) on Ethereum contained a critical flaw in its access control logic, specifically in the updateMerkleRoot function. This function was meant to be restricted to trusted parties—such as the contract owner or a specific privileged address—to securely update the Merkle root that determines reward eligibility. However, due to a logic inversion in the permission check, the contract accidentally allowed all addresses except the intended privileged ones to call the function.

What Happened

A critical access control flaw in SuperRare’s staking contract allowed an attacker to fraudulently claim ~$730K in $RARE tokens, with no public acknowledgment or recovery effort from the team to date.

Key Event Timeline - SuperRare updateMerkleRoot Backwards Permission Check Logic

Date	Event	Description
July 28th, 2025 2:21:47 AM MDT	Contract Deployment Transaction	Blockaid reports that this is the deployment of the smart contract. SolidityScan incorrectly reports this is the attack transaction.
July 28th, 2025 2:21:59 AM MDT	Attack Transaction	The attack transaction, according to BlockScope, SupLabsYi, Blockaid, PeckShield, and CertiK. The smart contract is abused to modify the Merkle root and
July 28th, 2025 3:53:00 AM MDT	SlowMist Posts Exploit Tweet	SlowMist posts on Twitter/X to report that the SuperRare platform appears to have suffered from a compromise. A vulnerability appears to allow anyone to update the Merkle root permissions and claim tokens.

Technical Details

A misconfiguration meant that any unauthorized user could submit a new, forged Merkle root and effectively claim staking rewards meant for legitimate users. By exploiting this, an attacker was able to generate a fraudulent distribution tree and drain approximately $730,000 worth of $RARE tokens. The exploit was further complicated by a frontrunning incident: although the attacker deployed an exploit contract, a separate address executed the actual draining transaction one block later, potentially using MEV strategies.

The exploit was the result of a critical flaw in the access control logic of the updateMerkleRoot function. This function, intended to be used only by authorized accounts (like the contract owner or a specific privileged address), contained an inverted permission check. Instead of verifying that only privileged users could call it, the logic was mistakenly written to exclude those privileged users—allowing anyone else to update the Merkle root. This effectively opened the door for any attacker to forge distribution roots and drain funds meant for legitimate stakers.

Using this vulnerability, the attacker submitted a fake Merkle root, allowing them to claim reward tokens they weren’t entitled to. The attacker deployed an exploit contract to facilitate the claim, but notably, the actual draining transaction was frontrun by another address one block later—indicating the presence of a MEV (Miner Extractable Value) bot or a separate opportunistic actor. The stolen funds, totaling 11.9 million $RARE ($730K USD), remain in the attacker's contract and have not yet been swapped or laundered.

Analysis shows the attacker’s address was funded via Tornado Cash approximately 186 days prior, suggesting premeditation and an attempt to anonymize the funding trail. This exploit underscores the importance of proper require statement logic in Solidity smart contracts, especially in access control functions. A simple correction—such as enforcing require(msg.sender == owner() || msg.sender == 0xc2F3...8ddc)—could have prevented this attack entirely. The event highlights how small errors in permission checks can lead to large financial losses in decentralized protocols.

Transactions: 0xf5b6531ead5023568b5063b131068a6dd4d8c9eac66a51666982d99af1a0d520

Attacker: 0x5B9B4B4DaFbCfCEEa7aFbA56958fcBB37d82D4a2

Victim Contract (SuperRare RareStaking V1): 0xfFB512B9176D527C5D32189c3e310Ed4aB2Bb9eC

Total Amount Lost

CertiK reports the loss as "11.9M RARE tokens (~$730K)". PeckShield and Blockaid also report $730k.

Cyvers has a screenshot showing the loss total as $731,809.68.

SupLabsYi reports a lower loss amount of $710k.

The total amount lost has been estimated at $730,000 USD.

Immediate Reactions

Multiple third parties have reported on the exploit transaction. The exploit does not appear to have been publicly acknowledged by the SuperRare team initially.

Ultimate Outcome

The incident does not appear to have been acknowledged by the SuperRare team on their website or social media.

Jonathan Perkins, co-founder of SuperRare, later informed Cointelegraph that the core protocol remains intact with no loss of funds. He added that around 61 wallets seem to have been impacted and assured that those affected will be fully compensated.

Total Amount Recovered

SuperRare's co-founder Jonathan Perkins has mentioned an intent to fully compensate all affected users. It has not been confirmed that this has been completed.

It is not publicly known whether the funds from the hack were returned.

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

Ongoing Developments

SuperRare is likely introducing development process changes based on this exploit. It is unclear what kind of investigation may be underway, or if funds have been returned.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.