SIL Finance Permissions Exploit
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The SIL Finance smart contract was exploited after a new piece of code was added, which introduced a vulnerability.
A malicious actor managed to steal some $12m from the contract through exploiting this vulnerability, however he was convinced to return the funds.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]
About SIL Finance
"SIL.Finance (Sister in Law) [is] a second-generation DeFi smart financial management platform."
"With SIL's single-token approach, DeFi miners deposit funds in exchange for tokens. These tokens can be staked in an eligible pool and serve as one-sided liquidity. A smart contract-powered matching system ensures that each pool's liquidity balance is maintained by matching liquidity providers with other users who have the opposite asset. Liquidity providers (LP) will then earn a profit from LP transaction fees and LP stakes from mining, swaps, and reforming LPs. Other than addressing the issue of impermanent loss, SIL.Finance's automatic LP grouping also enables users to claim their profits from the smart contract at all times. Moreover, the system will automatically stake users' newly claimed profits, which can compound their interest by converting rewards into new LP assets."
"DeFi gathers reasonable financial services SIL.Finance contract has high-risk loopholes. Later, SIL.Finance issued an article saying that the incident was caused by a vulnerability in the smart contract permissions, which in turn triggered a general preemptive trading robot to submit a series of transactions for profit. After discovering that the smart contract could not be withdrawn due to high-risk loopholes, after 36 hours of efforts such as SlowMist, it has successfully recovered USD 12.15 million. SIL.Finance stated that if any user assets are damaged in this incident, the team decided to use its own funds to launch a compensation plan: all users who suffered losses will receive 2 times the compensation, which will be issued in SIL."
"The smart contract vulnerability was introduced by a piece of new code that the SIL.FINANCE dev team pushed after the SlowMist audit. The intention of the update was to reduce the gas cost during deposit and withdrawal. The original contract is named MatchPairNormal and the optimized version, which is currently deployed on Ethereum Mainnet, is named MatchPairNormalV2. While the intention of the team was to help users save on gas, and the updated contracts were reviewed by SlowMist, the SIL.FINANCE team made the mistake of not conducting a full security audit after these changes were made."
"With the swift reaction and help from security firms and world-class white hats, we were able to get in contact with the operator of the frontrunning bot, who assisted in returning all the funds back to the team’s multi-sig wallet."
"After 36 hours of hard work and tremendous efforts by various parties, the SIL.FINANCE team is happy to announce that all SIL LP funds amount to a total of $12,151,258.16( at the time of posting) have been recovered and secured in a multi-sig wallet address under the team’s control: 0xca8A05c084B18bdb0c58ca85a39eCEB30Fb5f78e. The funds on this address are the combined result of two rescue efforts."
"Thank you for bearing with us!"
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| March 19th, 2021 | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $12,151,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
General Prevention Policies
A smart contract is a from of hot wallet, which means that the funds can be considered "online". There is no way to prove that hot wallets or smart contracts are secure.
The only secure method of storage for funds is in an offline multi-signature wallet.
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone (May 18, 2021)
- ↑ Follow Up on the Service Outage All Funds are SAFU (May 25, 2021)
- ↑ DeFi Smart Financial Management Platform SIL.Finance Announced the Completion of a $1.3 Million Private Round of Financing (May 25, 2021)
- ↑ Recent Activity Optimizations (May 25, 2021)
- ↑ @Sil_Finance Twitter (May 26, 2021)
- ↑ @Sil_Finance Twitter (May 26, 2021)
- ↑ SIL Finance Homepage (May 25, 2021)
- ↑ SIL Finance · GitHub (May 26, 2021)
- ↑ SIL.Finance - Block123 (May 26, 2021)
- ↑ blocksec-incidents/2021.md at main · openblocksec/blocksec-incidents · GitHub (Aug 11, 2021)