Rubic Exchange Proxy Router Exploit

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Rubic Exchange Website/Logo

Rubic, a decentralized exchange (DEX) aggregator operating across multiple chains, suffered a hack resulting in a loss exceeding $1.4 million. The attacker exploited a vulnerability in the RubicProxy contract's routerCallNative function, allowing unauthorized access to the whitelist and compromising the Tornado Cash mixing protocol. The breach was facilitated by the erroneous addition of USDC tokens to the whitelist, enabling the theft of these tokens from authorized users of the RubicProxy contract. Malicious users exploited the vulnerability by calling the USDC contract through the routerCallNative function, transferring the stolen tokens to the attacker's account. It is unclear if any of the stolen funds have been recovered.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Rubic Exchange

"Rubic aggregates 70+ blockchains and testnets, while it enables swaps of 15,500+ assets with the best rates, highest liquidity, and transaction speeds - in one click, thanks to the integration of 220+ DEXs and bridges. We focus on adding new emerging chains, which are often not present on giant DEXs and on-chain aggregators, ensuring that our users have access to the latest and most in-demand networks like zkSync Era, Polygon zkEVM, Mantle, Linea, Base, etc."

"Why Rubic Is Your Best Crypto Exchange? ON-CHAIN & CROSS-CHAIN SWAPS IN 1 CLICK SWAP TO EARN PROGRAM SMART ROUTING: BEST ROUTES AND RATES PRIVATE RPC FEATURE & MEV-BOT PROTECTION NO TRANSACTION LIMITS LIQUIDITY AGGREGATION 230,000+ users of the Rubic platform"

"Trusted by by more than 130 Crypto Brands"

"Rubic Is a Safe & Decentralized Crypto Exchange. Rubic doesn’t use any external servers: only Frontend and Blockchain. Our contract is thoroughly audited by MixBytes. We’re built on open-source software: Github. Swap Bitcoin and 15,500+ altcoins in a fast,simple & secure way!"

"Rubic Protocol said on December 25 that one of its routing contracts had been breached and that all contracts will be suspended while the issue is investigated. A cross-chain DEX aggregator is Rubic. Through the routerCallNative function of the RubicProxy contract, users can trade native tokens. It will first determine whether the target Router of the necessary call entered by the user is on the protocol’s white list before redeeming."

"One of our routing contracts might be compromised. All contracts will be stopped until we understand the situation fully. Please don't use http://rubic.exchange."

"Our token and DEX liquidity have not been touched. We will update you on the situation, please stay tuned."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - Rubic Exchange Proxy Router Exploit

Date	Event	Description
December 25th, 2022 1:31:11 AM MST	Exploit Happens	The blockchain transaction with the exploit is completed.
December 25th, 2022 1:47:23 AM MST	Funds To TornadoCash	The attacker managed to start taking their funds to TornadoCash.
December 25th, 2022 1:57:00 AM MST	PeckShield Summary	PeckShield posts a summary of the exploit on Twitter.
December 25th, 2022 2:52:00 AM MST	Notification Tweet	Rubic notified their users via Twitter that "[o]ne of [thei]r routing contracts might be compromised. All contracts will be stopped until we understand the situation fully."
December 25th, 2022 3:58:12 AM MST	CoinCu Article	CoinCu reports that Rubic, a decentralized exchange (DEX) aggregator operating across multiple chains, suffered a hack resulting in a loss exceeding $1.4 million. The attacker exploited a vulnerability in the RubicProxy contract's routerCallNative function, allowing unauthorized access to the whitelist and compromising the Tornado Cash mixing protocol. The breach was facilitated by the erroneous addition of USDC tokens to the whitelist, enabling the theft of these tokens from authorized users of the RubicProxy contract. Malicious users exploited the vulnerability by calling the USDC contract through the routerCallNative function, transferring the stolen tokens to the attacker's account. The incident underscores the importance of secure protocol management to prevent unauthorized access and token theft.
March 30th, 2023	MixBytes Audit	The Rubic Exchange completes an audit with MixBytes.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $1,410,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.