QuickSwap GoDaddy DNS Compromise

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QuickSwap Logo/Homepage

Decentralized exchange QuickSwap used and trusted GoDaddy for their domain name services. One day, an attacker managed to convince GoDaddy to modify the hostnames of the domain, directing the domain name to their own server, where they hosted a malicious replica of the QuickSwap website. Users who tried to interact with the QuickSwap website would be interacting with the malicious version, which routed their funds to the attacker's wallet. In total, the attacker was able to take $108,000 worth of funds before the domain could be fully rerouted back to the proper server. The QuickSwap team has put together a reimbursement fund for all affected users.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About QuickSwap

"On Friday, May 14th at approximately 12 am UTC, hijackers gained access to QuickSwap’s DNS through a vulnerability in GoDaddy - where QuickSwap’s domain was hosted. Before QuickSwap was able to regain control of our domain, several DEX users lost money by swapping through the platform. What follows is a more detailed explanation of what happened, what we’ve done to ensure something like this doesn’t happen again, and a governance proposal about whether QuickSwap should use funds from our treasury to issue an endowment to those who were affected."

"QuickSwap’s co-founder and lead developer Sameep Singhania was on the phone with GoDaddy Support trying to figure out what happened and regain access to our domain. After several hours of arguing and going through multiple GoDaddy representatives, Sameep finally convinced someone on the support team to change the email address back to one that is in QuickSwap’s control. This helpful GoDaddy associate also reset the 2-factor authentication to Sameep’s control. This was all done without GoDaddy’s support staff taking a single measure to confirm Sameep’s identity or ensure that he was the rightful owner of the QuickSwap domain."

"From the GoDaddy logs, we can see that someone was able to change the email address QuickSwap provided to his or her personal address. From our own experience getting the email address reset, we know how easily this can be accomplished with GoDaddy support. After gaining access to the email and 2FA, the attacker changed the password and was then able to change the DNS settings. S/he pulled the code from the beta version of our UI from GitHub and the phishing attack began. All in, approximately $107,600 USD was traded on QuickSwap during the phishing attack and lost to the attacker."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - QuickSwap GoDaddy DNS Compromise

Date	Event	Description
May 13th, 2022 7:46:00 PM MDT	Domain Compromised	The SpiritSwap domain name is found to be compromised and a warning is posted on Twitter.
May 14th, 2022 1:19:00 AM MDT	Mudit Gupta DDOS Guard Tweet	Mudit Gupta requests for DDOSGuard to stop serving SpiritSwap, QuickSwap, and HoneySwap, and calls them all phishing websites.
May 16th, 2022 6:07:06 PM MDT	PostMortem Published	SpiritSwap publishes a postmortem on Medium.
May 19th, 2022 3:11:00 PM MDT	Endowment Fund Proposal	QuickSwap shares an announcment about the incident and a proposal to generate funds to reimburse affected users.
June 17th, 2022	PermaWeb Article	A PermaWeb article covers the attacks on QuickSwap, and mentions attacks on SpiritSwap, and HoneySwap.
June 28th, 2022 10:52:05 PM MDT	Blockchain Thread Intelligence	Blockchain Thread Intelligence includes special mention of a GoDaddy phishing attack in their newsletter.
May 14th, 2023 1:00:00 AM MDT	Control Regained	QuickSwap reportedly regains control of their domain name.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $108,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

The total amount recovered has been estimated at $108,000 USD.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.