MyEtherWallet Cryptojacking Protection Extension
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A clever phishing campaign appears as a warning from Google against a detected cryptojacking script running on a webpage. The warning recommends the user to download a functioning extension which detects and removes known cryptojacking scripts - with the only slight caveat that it will also steal private keys from common web-based wallet software like Blockchain.info and MyEtherWallet. Information is sent off to the fraudster and used to steal funds from victims. There was no information found on how much was lost or whether any recovery or justice has been attempted in this case.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5]
About MyEtherWallet
"I recently discovered an airdrop site for Huobi that used a different MyEtherWallet phishing kit to what I am used to finding." "I came across an ERC20 token that was advertising a website that was airdropped to ~20,000 Ethereum addresses."
"[T]he [airdropper] has [c]reated 18 contracts between block 6,708,041 and 7,249,374. All but 1 contract address advertises huobiairdrop.com — the other is just a test. 62,132 addresses were sent a token that advertises huobiairdrop.com."
When viewing the site "I saw a legitimate looking Google Alert view that had me confused — I didn’t know Google detected Cryptojacking like this…" "I decided to view the source and saw that it was linking me to a Google Chrome Browser Extension." "NoCoin — Block Coin Miners"
"From the start, it looked like it did what it should — it was detect[ing] various CryptoJacking scripts (CoinHive, MinerAlt, WebminerPool) and there was a nice UI to let me know it was doing its job." "[T]he browser extension does what it was advertised to do, so it could [easily] go unnoticed to the non-paranoid user for some time."
The only problem is the script also "injects malicious scripts into MyEtherWallet.com and Blockchain.com by hijacking the CSP headers and network requests."
"It monitors/hijacks all web requests by attaching an EventListener to onBeforeRequest and onHeadersReceived[.] Depending on the network activity, it would [redirect traffic to] a domain on the .top TLD." "[I]t overwrites the [Content Security Policy] so it can “safely” inject code from untrusted sources…"
"Since the code is looking for [a] master or chunk substring in the resource, the main target is the vintage.myetherwallet.com domain to overwrite the etherwallet-master.js file." "We can see that it’s trying to load malicious versions of; manifest.1550618679966.js, vendor.b18ffdf080.js, app.46d4854459.js within the [Blockchain.com] login logic." "[T]he main JS is being replaced by the malicious browser extension [for both sites]." "[O]ur private key [gets] sent to the bad actors."
"We have to be careful on what we do. The duty is on you to ensure your maximum safety and security. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. Never install a browser extension that has the ability to modify the DOM that you/trusted source has not audited. Don’t blindly trust legitimate looking warnings to get you to install software (MetaMask warnings will always have their browser extension in the URL bar (like the phishing warning)). Never enter your secrets online — always use an offline signing mechanism (i.e: Ledger Wallet, TREZOR, or Parity Signer)."
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| March 14th, 2019 | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost is unknown.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
General Prevention Policies
Care should be taken to minimize the number of installed applications or extensions on any computer which is used to handle funds. It would be recommended to avoid using web-based wallets, given the high number of instances where they have been compromised. Instead, private keys should be stored on dedicated hardware such as a hardware wallet. Funds should also be kept fully offline until they are actually needed. More advanced users may consider a multi-signature setup.
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ Discovering Fake Browser Extensions That Target Users Of Ledger Trezor Mew Metamask And More (Aug 22, 2022)
- ↑ Hunting Huobi Scams (Dec 27, 2022)
- ↑ CSP modification - YouTube (Dec 27, 2022)
- ↑ yw2ZhEtBwn - YouTube (Dec 27, 2022)
- ↑ 2019 In Review: Major Blockchain/Crypto Security Incidents | MyCrypto Blog (Dec 28, 2022)