Monster Slayer Finance Rug Pull

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Monster Slayer Finance

According to CertiK And some other independent reports, shortly after launching and getting a full audit, the Monster Slayer Financce project was able to withdraw over $2m worth of investor funds from the smart contract hot wallet. While the Medium page is gone, the website and all other social media appears to exist presently.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Monster Slayer Finance

"Welcome to Monster Slayer! Can't save the world with an empty pocket."

"Monster Slayer Finance is designed by the game finance team as the foundation for our upcoming, entirely decentralized, and transparent NFT game. Combining aspects of an interesting NFT game using a stablecoin with the butter smooth and blazing speed of the Binance Smart Chain, all while costing you no more than a few pennies."

"Inspired by Basis, bDollar, MITH and many more projects, Monster Slayer Finance will be a multi-token protocol that consists of three tokens: Monster Slayer Cash (MSC), Monster Slayer Share (MSS), and Monster Slayer Bond (MSB)." "Monster Slayer Cash (MSC), Monster Slayer Share (MSS), and Monster Slayer Bond (MSB) MSC tokens are designed to be used as a medium of exchange. The built-in stability mechanism in the protocol deterministically expands and contracts the MSC supply to maintain MSC's peg to 1 $BUSD token. When TWAP - the time-weighted average price of MSC is above the 1 $BUSD peg, the protocol mints more MSC to keep the price of MSC lowers (to $1) and distributes them proportionally to all MSS holders who have staked their tokens inside the boardroom. MSS holders have voting rights and the ability to create proposals to improve the protocol."

"MSS loosely represents the value of the Monster Slayer Cash and trust in its systemic ability to maintain MSC to peg. During epoch expansions (when TWAP — the time-weighted average price of MSC is above the 1 $BUSD peg), the protocol mints MSC and distributes it proportionally to all MSS holders who have staked their tokens inside the boardroom."

"MSB determent the changes in MSC supply during both epoch expansion and contraction periods. For starters, the exchange rate for MSC to MSB is always 1:1. When MSC’s TWAP falls below 1 $BUSD peg, MSB gets issued and can be bought with MSC at its prevailing price. Doing so takes MSC out of its circulating supply through burning."

"MSC holders can exchange for MSB with a 1:1 ratio. MSB enjoy up to 30% bonus when MSC returns to peg and above. MSB has no expiry date and can be exchanged for MSC at any moment, with a 10% penalty if you do it when MSC is under peg. When redeeming, The Treasury will be in charge of handing out MSC for MSB exchanged."

"The token supply will have to expand to push the price back down to 1$ and you will now be able to exchange MSB to MSC without the penalty. In this phase, the contract will mint a certain amount of MSC and these will be distributed into The Treasury, The Boardroom, and The Stable Fund."

"We have contacted one of the leading audit firms in the crypto space, Certik, and the agreement had been signed. The agreement includes both the audition itself and Shield service for extra protection from Certik." "Payment for auditing: $10,000 (ten thousand USD). Payment for CertikShield insurance service, 2 months (60 days) package: $5,000 (five thousand USD)."

"As our next step, two new pools for users to stake their MSC and MSB is coming soon with the total reward amount of 1 Million USD. Further details will be announced on Monday, March 29th at 02:00 AM UTC -5."

According to CertiK, "[t]he Dev moved the $5m stabilisation funds to Binance and are now trying to control the panic until their timelock on the new contract."

"Barely 48hrs after the deployment of the new regulation page, Certik made the allegations and tagged the incidence a rugpull event. which reads zero (0) for most metrics." "The Regulation feature is integrated to act as a stabilizer to the MonsterSlayer stable coin’s algorithmic value and shows what goes on inside each of the Epoch, i.e., the redeemed, bonded, and expanded."

"There is a powerful silence in all communication portals of the tasks from the challenge team. No admin is in sight on the Telegram Group and has left users speculating, losing inciting messages, and calling the task a rip-off."

"Like this forwarded message from Dani, a Telegram member that alleges that a migrator characteristic has been included into the brand new agreement."

“If you are in on monsterslayer.finance, it is probably high-quality to withdraw your funds ASAP. There’s a migrator function in their new contract.”

"Warning: This project has been confirmed to be a rugpull and is deemed high risk. Do not engage, or interact, with this project."

"A BNB transaction from the Regulation wallet into Binance hot wallet tracked on Bscan tells us much more about the developing situation and a further confirmation on Certik Rugpull claims." "A total of 5,749.57577337 BNB at above $2m in today’s rate was sent to the hot wallet [on April 6th, 2021]."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - Monster Slayer Finance Rug Pull

Date	Event	Description
April 6th, 2021 12:32:13 AM MDT	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $2,317,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

The total amount recovered is unknown.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

Funds stored in smart contract hot wallets face many risks, especially when the wallet is controlled by an anonymous developer. For proper protection, uninsured funds should be stored in a multi-sig wallet with all keys stored offline and held by known and trained individuals. At least two seprate reviews of this setup should be conducted.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.