Ledger Malware Phishing
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A user of Ledger hardware wallets reported that their Ledger Live application was replaced by a malicious version which requested the seed phrase, claiming it was necessary to restore the wallet. Once the seed phrase was entered in the malicious application, all funds were drained from their account.
Other users also responded reported having experienced the same malware, including at least one who reported losing $20k worth of bitcoin. There is limited information and no reports of funds being recovered successfully.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]
About Ledger
"Based in France, Ledger is the largest cryptocurrency hardware wallet company." "Ledger is a hardware cryptocurrency wallet that is used to store, manage, and sell cryptocurrency. The funds held in these wallets are secured using a 24-word recovery phrase and an optional secret passphrase that only the owner knows."
"Ledger offers two products, the Nano S and Nano X, that can store the digital keys used to secure crypto wallets. The devices can be used with a variety of cryptocurrencies, are compatible with numerous apps, and are supposed to offer a safe way to manage crypto without compromising too much on convenience. Ledger says on its website that it has sold 1.5 million products to customers in 165 countries to date."
"[W]e’ve detected a malware that locally replaces the Ledger Live desktop application by a malicious one. Users of infected computers are asked to enter their 24-word recovery phrase after a fake update."
"Our apps will never ever ask you to enter your 24 words directly on your PC keyboard with Nano S, Blue and Nano X." "A legitimate Ledger Live version would *never* ask for your 24-word recovery phrase - if you would receive any such notification, please contact us." "This malicious version of Ledger Live would only be asking for your 24-word recovery phrase (which should *never* be shared)."
"[T]he malware has been so far detected on one computer, and we have no reason to believe it exists on a mobile app form. If you follow our security best practices of never entering your 24-word recovery phrase on your computer, and verifying tx/addresses on device, you are safe."
"This malware is infecting only Windows machines, and it looks like it's highly targeted (we have seen so far only once instance on one computer). It cannot compromise your device or your crypto. It's only a phishing attempt tricking you in entering your 24 words (never do that)" "Happens on Mac also."
"[W]e do not know yet the infection method, but we confirm it has nothing to do with our website or servers. Ledger Live was downloaded normally by the user, and a malware changed the binary locally a couple of months after."
"Hardware wallets have been designed to protect crypto assets against this kind of attacks. Funds are safe unless users themselves give their recovery phrase to the hacker (through social trickery). Education of users is paramount to mitigate this."
"Hi, I just got done by this. Is there any way to retrieve my funds?" "Yes I lost $20k of BTC falling for this!" Too "late for me, I entered my 24 word phrase and I am waiting on Ledger to contact me for how to fix or what should I do."
"Oh no I haven’t logged in in two years and I think I have fallen victim to this trap! I had problems updating firmware 1.31 to 1.60 and then saw this pop up and I entered my 24 letter passcode thinking it was indeed your app! Within a minute my my account was emptied out!"
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| April 25th, 2019 9:41:00 AM MDT | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $20,000+ USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
General Prevention Policies
Familiarize yourself with what a seed phrase is when you own a hardware wallet.
Never enter the seed phrase in any software on your computer or phone under any circumstance. The seed phrase is only intended to be entered in the hardware wallet device itself.
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ Ledger Live : Most trusted & secure crypto wallet | Ledger (Feb 13, 2022)
- ↑ Ledger Refuses Refunds, Tells Clients “Bank Vault Is More Secure” | Financegates (Mar 19, 2022)
- ↑ Physical Addresses of 270K Ledger Owners Leaked On Hacker Forum - Slashdot (Mar 19, 2022)
- ↑ Scammers Are Using Fake Devices to Steal Cryptocurrency Wallets | PCMag (Mar 6, 2022)
- ↑ @Ledger Twitter (Jun 12, 2022)
- ↑ @LifeIsG94605187 Twitter (Oct 18, 2022)
- ↑ @SlashR4 Twitter (Oct 18, 2022)
- ↑ @SteveLawson1964 Twitter (Oct 18, 2022)
- ↑ @SteveLawson1964 Twitter (Oct 18, 2022)
- ↑ @Ledger Twitter (Oct 18, 2022)
- ↑ @GoMightyMouse Twitter (Oct 18, 2022)
- ↑ Ledger 101 Part 3 Best Practices When Using A Hardware Wallet (Oct 18, 2022)
- ↑ @cryptomedius Twitter (Oct 18, 2022)
- ↑ @Ledger Twitter (Oct 18, 2022)