HoneySwap GoDaddy DNS Compromise

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HoneySwap Logo/Homepage

Decentralized exchange HoneySwap used and trusted GoDaddy for their domain name services. One day, an attacker managed to convince GoDaddy to modify the hostnames of the domain, directing the domain name to their own server, where they hosted a malicious replica of the HoneySwap website. Users who tried to interact with the HoneySwap website would be interacting with the malicious version, which routed their funds to the attacker's wallet. In total, the attacker was able to take $20,000 worth of funds before the domain could be fully rerouted back to the proper server. The HoneySwap team reported that they would be compensating all affected users.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About HoneySwap

"Honeyswap is a Decentralized Exchange" "Honeyswap is comprised of liquidity pool contracts deployed to multiple EVM compatible chains which share common frontend interfaces that are maintained by the 1Hive community. Currently Honeyswap supports xDai and Polygon, but plans to expand support to other EVM chains and rollups in the future.

Honeyswap uses a multi-token model to manage the balance between Global and Local incentives. Development, support, and maintainence work that has Global benefits are funded using Honey from 1Hive's common pool. Farming Rewards, where benefits are localized to a one supported chain use a Comb token which can be valued as a derivative of the volume on that specific chain.

Swap fees on Honeyswap are split 1/12 to Honey, 1/12 to the local Comb token for that chain, and 5/6 directly to the pool of liquidity providers facilitating the swap."

"Do not use Honeyswap to make transactions right now! Most probably a front-end error on our side is causing transactions to lead to a malicious address."

"Anyone that used honeyswap in the past 2 days please go to https://revoke.cash and make sure you have no approvals to an address you do not know. Specially look for ⚠️0xD3888a7E6D6A05c6b031F05DdAF3D3dCaB92FC5B"

"We are happy to let you know that we've recovered http://Honeyswap.org domain and you should be able to use it now VERY IMPORTANT- Clear you cache, check if you have this quote from Marcus Aurelius (as shown on image) and not pulling some older cached version."

"Honeyswap domain has been hijacked. We are currently working with domain provider if we can get ASAP access to domain and return everything on place from before. If you know someone who used Honeyswap in past 2 days notify them and do not trade on honeyswap."

"We will create proposal to reimburse those who lost funds due to this unfortunate event, total funds lost are less than 20K$ so it should not be a problem for @1HiveOrg to support this proposal on our @gardensdao governance platform."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - HoneySwap GoDaddy DNS Compromise

Date	Event	Description
May 9th, 2022 1:43:00 PM MDT	Warning On Twitter	A warning is shared by the HoneySwap team, without a cause being identified. Users are requested to revoke permissions from a malicious smart contract.
May 9th, 2022 2:38:39 PM MDT	Wallet Funded	The malicious wallet is first funded.
May 9th, 2022 2:54:40 PM MDT	XDAI Transaction	The time of the first malicious XDAI transaction.
May 10th, 2022 3:05:00 AM MDT	Domain Hijacked	HoneySwap announces that the domain has been hijacked on Twitter.
May 11th, 2022 12:02:00 PM MDT	Domain Back Online	HoneySwap reports that their domain is now back online.
May 14th, 2022 1:19:00 AM MDT	Mudit Gupta DDOS Guard Tweet	Mudit Gupta requests for DDOSGuard to stop serving SpiritSwap, QuickSwap, and HoneySwap, and calls them all phishing websites.
June 17th, 2022	PermaWeb Article	A PermaWeb article covers the attacks on QuickSwap, and mentions attacks on SpiritSwap, and HoneySwap.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $20,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

The total amount recovered has been estimated at $20,000 USD.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.