GrowingFi Withdraw Not Checked
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Despite an audit from CertiK, the GrowingFi platform smart contract hot wallet still suffered a significant theft. The platform ran multiple attempts to create a recovery for their affected users and it appears they may have compensated a large portion of the funds, though nowhere near all of them.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19]
About GrowingFi
"Growing.fi is the best-in-class Decentralized Finance (DeFi) aggregation platform. We devote ourselves to making DeFi easier for everyone and make Growing.fi your gateway to the world of DeFi."
"Growing.fi start as a Defi portfolio management tool (aka Growing Dashboard) on the Binance Smart Chain (BSC) back in March 2021."
"Since then, the Growing Dashboard has been used and loved by tens of thousands of yield farmers. We received a lot of love and feedback from our growing community. Among all feedback and feature requests, native smart contract integration for farming platforms is most requested. It also aligns with our goal to become not only the dashboard but also the portal for Defi."
"Inspired by PancakeBunny, Beefy, and Autofarm. Growing Farms is yet another yield optimizer platform on BSC, focusing on providing auto-compounded yields by actively finding, auditing, and leveraging the best yield farming platforms through smart optimizing strategies. With the on-chain farm performance data we collected, Growing Farm stands in a superior position to provide best-in-class returns."
"The smart contracts of Growing Farm is a remix of Sushi, Auto, Bunny, and many other prior arts. We have tested them on BSC Testnet, Mainnet, and other EVM compatible networks for a few weeks. However, they have not been audited yet. You are strongly suggested to read the source code of our smart contracts and do please give us feedback if you find anything we can improve."
On July 8th, a CertiK audit "report [was] prepared for GrowingFi to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the GrowingFi project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques."
"There is one noticeable high privilege role across different contracts in the GrowingFi project. The owner can modify critical configurations for one or more contracts. If an attacker takes control over any one of the roles, the actions he can perform will endanger the users' farming reward and the value of the Grow token. The overly powerful owner is a centralization risk as he can perform actions without obtaining the consensus of the community."
"On 14th Sep 2021, Growing Farm on BSC and Polygon was attacked, resulting in a loss of funds for about $1.2M. Only assets in the v2 pool were affected. We have fixed and upgraded all affected contracts."
"The issue was related to the `_withdraw` function in v2 pools. While v1 checks for the principal amount, the v2 pools removed that and caused insufficient validation for user inputs. The attacker exploited it with a small amount of deposit and calling `withdraw()` with a large amount of `wantedAmount`."
"There was no attack, these projects are finished, the scammed people, running a mixture of ponzi scheme + slow rug pull scheme : where they pretend to be legit and hardworking but in real they just typing tech con men."
"Still waiting for your comments on, $1.2m the yesterday theft by one or team of devs on @GrowingFi, exploited the smart contract and emptied out the LP tokens of people. @certik_io didn't say anything and on their website everything is fine."
"is @RektHQ really not going to cover the 1.2M stolen by @GrowingFi ???"
"A team member resigned and deleted his account due to the threats he received. We the rest of the team understand and will carry on the development and the going-forward plan."
"Since our own funds have also been affected and lost almost all of them. We will be using all the rest of the funds we have (the Dev Fund and personal funds from the team members) to compensate as many users affected as possible."
"1. The first stage of the compensation will be covering all the users affected with an amount less than $100, all and each of them will be compensated 100% of the funds they lose immediately in BUSD/USDC; 2. If there are any funds left after the first stage, we will continue to compensate users with amounts between $100 and $1000 proportionally in both BUSD/USDC and GROW/PLOW; 3. Users affected with the amount > $1000 will be getting the creditor token to the Auction and received funds sold according to the original plan."
"We are rolling out a 3 stage compensation plan. Includes an auction to sell the ownership of our project to raise money to compensate the affected users." "Based on the going-forward plan we announced earlier, an auction sale of the project will be held to remedy the victims."
"We are very thankful and humbled to announce that we have secured a sum of $100k of funding in exchange for the future design and dev service from the dev team, 100% of it will be used to remedy the victims of the attack;" "We are and will continue to do everything we can to remedy all the affected users."
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| September 14th, 2021 | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $1,200,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
General Prevention Policies
There are a number of ways to prevent and mitigate this situation. It is far more secure to have the majority of funds in a multi-signature wallet where keys are stored offline by multiple operators. This would limit the potential loss to only those funds being actively within the hot wallet. Audits can be used to reduce the risks on the hot wallets further, and we advocate at least 2 reviews would be required prior to a project launch. We also propose a comprehensive industry insurance fund which could be available to assist.
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ @ErmiyaK Twitter (Nov 13, 2021)
- ↑ @FigoloX Twitter (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ Growing.fi (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ GrowingFi Docs (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ Overview (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ @growingfi - channel telegram audience statistics Growing.fi (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ https://certik-public-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/REP-GrowingFi-2021-07-12.pdf (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ https://medium.com/@GrowingFi/growing-farm-sep-14th-incident-report-71de3abd172a (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ https://bscscan.com/tx/0xbe281fcb8902fa38e0f1842dec35221a9c3e26df73ed089927a965a99b6f0249 (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ https://bscscan.com/tx/0x0bb198673e42e858d1121ce2c0e7b324569c83fef7d0cb6a76555c294fa9c9d2 (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ Updates On The Compensation And Going Forward Plan (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ @ErmiyaK Twitter (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ @GrowingFi Twitter (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ @GrowingFi Twitter (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ @GrowingFi Twitter (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ @GrowingFi Twitter (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ @GrowingFi Twitter (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ @GrowingFi Twitter (Dec 21, 2021)
- ↑ Growing Farm Incident Compensation Plan Details (Dec 21, 2021)