GPU Token Transfer Vulnerability

Notice: This page is a freshly imported case study from the original repository. The original content was in a different format, and may not have relevant information for all sections. Please help restructure the content by moving information from the 'About' section to other sections, and add any missing information or sources you can find. If you are new here, please read General Tutorial on Wikis or Anatomy of a Case Study for help getting started.

Notice: This page contains sources which are not attributed to any text. The unattributed sources follow the initial description. Please assist by visiting each source, reviewing the content, and placing that reference next to any text it can be used to support. Feel free to add any information that you come across which isn't present already. Sources which don't contain any relevant information can be removed. Broken links can be replaced with versions from the Internet Archive. See General Tutorial on Wikis, Anatomy of a Case Study, and/or Citing Your Sources Guide for additional information. Thanks for your help!

Generic Image

A smart contract token named GPU on the Binance Smart Chain (with no relation to the similarly named GPU token by NodeAI) was launched and catastrophically failed on May 8th, 2024. The token had a vulnerability which allowed the user to double any amount of the token which they sent to themselves. The massive supply inflation caused a quick collapse of the token price.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About None

"We detected that $GPU was exploited due to an incorrect balance update."

"GPU on BNBChain was attacked, with a loss of about $32,000. There is a logic vulnerability in the _transfer function of the contract. When transferring money to yourself, the balance will increase by the amount of the transfer."

"classic self-transfer problem, user transfer himself will increase token balance, in this transfer code , if sender=recipient , balance of sender will add the transfer amount"

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - GPU Token Transfer Vulnerability

Date	Event	Description
May 8th, 2024 12:47:56 AM MDT	Smart Contract Created	The GPU smart contract is first created.
May 8th, 2024 4:01:39 AM MDT	SlowMist Transaction Referenced	The transaction which is referenced by SlowMist.
May 8th, 2024 4:26:00 AM MDT	Report By SlowMist	SlowMist reports on the GPU incident being attacked.
May 8th, 2024 4:27:00 AM MDT	PeckShield Tweet Post	PeckShield posts a tweet about the exploit.
May 8th, 2024 8:02:00 AM MDT	ExVul Tweet Posted	ExVul Security posts an analysis of the exploit.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $32,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.