Dough Finance ConnectorDeleverageParaswap Vulnerability
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Dough Finance is a DeFi protocol integrating other DeFi services into an easy-to-use interface to help users automatically manage their cryptocurrency. Due to unvalidated call data in the “ConnectorDeleverageParaswap” function, $1.81m worth of assets were able to be drained from the Dough Finance smart contract. The smart contract has an ongoing effort to recover the funds, which has so far recovered only part of the funds for users.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]
About Dough Finance
Dough Finance is a DeFi protocol, and its DeFi Smart Account (DSA) integrates various DeFi services into an easy-to-use interface to help users manage their digital currency in an automated manner.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
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- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
"According to monitoring by the SlowMist security team, Dough Finance was attacked due to a contract vulnerability. Some unauthorized funds were extracted by hackers, resulting in a loss of approximately $1.81 million."
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| June 13th, 2024 10:22:23 AM MDT | Blockchain Transaction | A blockchain transaction creates a smart contrat that's likely related to the exploit. |
| July 12th, 2024 1:22:47 AM MDT | Blockchain Transaction | The timestamp of the blockchain exploit transaction, according to ExVul. |
| July 12th, 2024 3:51:59 AM MDT | CoinTelegraph Article | A CoinTelegraph article is published about the exploit. |
| July 12th, 2024 6:40:00 AM MDT | Team Twitter Announcement | Dough Finance makes an announcement on Twitter explaining the exploit as they understand it. |
| July 16th, 2024 10:03:00 AM MDT | Partial Fund Recovery | Dough Finance announces that they have now recovered part of the funds which were taken. |
Technical Details
"According to Cyvers, the attacker was funded through the zero-knowledge (ZK) protocol Railgun and swapped the stolen USD Coin for Ether. The attacker got a total of 608 ETH, worth about $1.8 million."
"Web3 security provider Olympix highlighted that the exploit was due to unvalidated call data within the “ConnectorDeleverageParaswap” contract. The firm explained:
“The contract didn’t properly check the data it received during flash loan calls, allowing the attacker to manipulate it for their benefit.” Because of this, the attacker was able to manipulate the data and steal the funds.
Olympix said those who deposited funds in the DeFi protocol’s exploited contract might be impacted. However, the security provider noted that the hack did not impact Aave pools."
Total Amount Lost
"We detected potential suspicious activity related to @DoughFina. Loss $1.81M."
The total amount lost has been estimated at $1,810,000 USD.
Immediate Reactions
"Attention Dough Finance Users, We've identified an exploit: a few early Dough DeFi Smart Accounts (DSAs) were affected by a sophisticated exploit, resulting in unauthorized fund withdrawals."
Ultimate Outcome
"Update: We've recovered part of the stolen funds! These funds will go directly to the relief fund. Our team is working tirelessly with cybersecurity experts to recover the remaining assets. Thank you for your support and patience. #Recovery #DeFi"
Total Amount Recovered
The total amount recovered is unknown.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ @SlowMist_Team Twitter (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ ConnectorDeleverageParaswap | Address 0x9f54e8eaa9658316bb8006e03fff1cb191aafbe6 | Etherscan (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ https://cointelegraph.com/news/dough-finance-loses-1-8m-flash-loan-attack (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ https://www.rootdata.com/Projects/detail/Dough%20Finance (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ @DoughFina Twitter (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ @H4ckManac Twitter (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ @Olympix_ai Twitter (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ @EXVULSEC Twitter (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ @DoughFina Twitter (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ @Olympix_ai Twitter (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)
- ↑ @DoughFina Twitter (Accessed Jul 16, 2024)