Defibox Hack Despite Double Audit

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Defibox

Defibox offers a wide range of blockchain services including a swap contract. Their twice-audited smart contract for swapping still had an exploit. The incident is not mentioned on their Twitter.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Defibox

"Defibox is a one-stop DeFi application platform. It is initiated and managed by the Defibox Foundation. The project was launched on EOS chain on July 21, 2020 and Swap protocol was launched on BSC chain on July 21, 2021. Defibox is committed to becoming the most popular DeFi application platform among users. Currently, Defibox has launched three protocols, namely Swap protocol, USN stable coin protocol and decentralized lending protocol."

"Insure the contract safety from multiple dimensions. Including security audit, multi-signature contract, bug-county program and code open source. Putting user capital security as first place."

"Swap is decentralized token swap and AMM (automatic market-making) protocol. The protocol was launched on EOS chain on July 21, 2020 and was launched on BSC chain on July 21, 2021. It provides swap prices in real time through the constant product algorithm, and users can also create swap markets and become market makers. Transaction fees are distributed to the market makers based on the proportion of liquidity."

"The Defibox Swap contract started its first security audit on July 19, and has been audited many times so far." "The Defibox Swap smart contract has passed the security audit of PeckShield and SlowMist."

"Defibox discovered an abnormal exchange situation of the EOS-EMOON trading pair at 22:00 on September 16th."

"This exchange abnormality is caused by the incompatibility between the Defibox Swap contract and the EMOON contract. Before the event, the number of pots was 482636464535179.88 EMOON/4866.1494 EOS. When the contract was suspended, the EMOON pot was 5790970803030.11 EMOON/3.4553EOS, resulting in about 4863 EOS. loss."

"The Swap error is caused by the Incompatibility of Defibox Swap contract and EMOON contract. The liquidity pool was 482636464535179.88 EMOON/4866.1494 EOS before the incident; When the contract was suspended, the EMOON liquidity became 5790970803030.11E MOON/3.4553 EOS, resulting a loss of 4863 EOS. At the moment, Defibox team has excluded the potential risk of burning token that might bring and upgraded Swap contract, improving contract safety level."

"Defibox has found a Swap error of EOS-EMOON on 22:00 September 16, 2021 (HKT)."

"After an emergency investigation, the swap contract was suspended at 0:00 on September 17th, and it was reopened on the morning of September 17th after auditing and multiple signings were completed." "With an emergency, Swap contract is suspended on 00:00 September 17, 2021 (HKT)."

"The Swap contract was open again on September 17 morning after completing audit and multi-signature."

"At present, the Defibox team has eliminated this type of risk caused by other burning tokens, and has upgraded the Swap contract to further improve the security of the contract."

"The Defibox Foundation will activate the risk reserve and pay 4863 EOS to the EMOON community." "Defibox Foundation apologize deeply for the loss caused to EMOON Community.Defibox Foundation will use risk reserve of 4863 EOS to compensate EMOON Community. For the details of compensation solution, Defibox will contact EMOON Community and let EMOON Community make the decision and announcement."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - Defibox Hack Despite Double Audit

Date	Event	Description
September 16th, 2021	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $24,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

In general, incidents like this can be expected when hot wallets are involved. Platforms should be prepared to fully cover the loss of funds in all hot wallets for users.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.