CryptoCashBack Rewards Program Trojan
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CryptoCashBack appeared to offer a compelling loyalty program, where users could sign up to get up to 15% cash back on their purchases, reportedly even some cash back when using popular exchange platforms. In order to take advantage of this incredible offer, users only needed to download and install the CryptoCashBack extension for Google Chrome. Once the extension was installed, users would browse as normal, only noticing that occasionally they would be prompted to enter two-factor authentication or confirm the odd withdrawal from their exchange account. Data harvesting of their login credentials happened in the background. It was reported that 23.23550279 BTC was stolen through this method, which had a market value of roughly $85k at the time. There is no indication that any of the lost funds were recovered.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]
About CryptoCashBack
"The first Blockchain Cash Back service." "Probably, this is the most profitable program of loyalty in the world. Get some money back and spend it on purchases."
"Our mission is to take you on a wonderful journey of the exciting world of Blockchain and cryptocurrency through a trading experience full of never-ending benefits and rewards." "We return up to 5% from each transaction. Use the system and get a portion of the money spent back to your wallet."
"If you make a transaction on 0.02 Bitcoin, and you have a promotional code, our service will return you 5% — 0.001 Bitcoin cashback." "We support 3 most popular currencies. We plan to expand support to 10 currencies in the near future."
"FAST - Transact in seconds. Get confirmed in minutes. GREAT PAYOUTS - Get up to 15% Cashback. SAFE - We do not store any data about users of the system. SIMPLE - Easy to use. No hassles."
"Download and install our extension to Google Chrome. Login on your blockchain and make a transaction. Get Cashback for cryptowallet." "[A]ll you need to do is install a browser extension to get that 5% cashback." "Start Earning Cash Back Today"
"The project promised users money back on different transactions, even on centralized crypto exchanges, but turned out to be a scheme to steal a variety of login information and siphon off cryptocurrencies." "Since its Chrome store launch on December 3, 2018, the attackers have purportedly managed to steal a bit more than 23 bitcoin (roughly [$81,650] as of press time)." "[T]he hackers behind it managed to make off with 23.23550279 BTC."
"A user who first installed the browser extension was met with requests to open all tabs and cookies, along with permission for write access to domains like Github, Binance, Coinbase, and LocalBitcoins.The malicious extension was primed to steal different information based on what website a user was on. On Binance for example, it would swipe a person’s login information, 2FA codes, CSRF tokens, and then would try to steal cryptocurrency."
"The overall goal of the extension as to steal login information and then try to trick users into accepting crypto withdraws to the scammer’s accounts. According to the Medium post, initial speculation is that it is “highly likely this is a RU outfit doing this” due to the presence of “Russian code comments.”"
"At the time of discovery, their extension — Chrome extension ID liachincjagnalnmahhaioaogkngbmhf (CCB Cash)— had 181 users on it." "Google has since removed CCB Cash from its extension store." "An Etherscamdb page for ‘cryptocashback.org’ indicated it was a scam domain that was offline. Those behind the post said they notified targeted exchanges about the malicious extension so they could investigate."
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| January 18th, 2019 | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $85,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
General Prevention Policies
It is recommended that funds be stored completely offline unless being actively used. When signing transactions, this should be performed on a device that has barebones software installed such as a hardware wallet. Every extension on the browser introduces vulnerabilities, and great care should be taken to ensure that extensions are carefully vetted. Trusting online reviews alone is often not sufficient. More advanced users may set up a multi-signature wallet.
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ Discovering Fake Browser Extensions That Target Users Of Ledger Trezor Mew Metamask And More (Aug 22, 2022)
- ↑ Malicious browser extension ifmkfoeijeemajoodjfoagpbejmmnkhm - YouTube (Dec 28, 2022)
- ↑ The Dangers Of Malicious Browser Extensions (Aug 22, 2022)
- ↑ The first Blockchain Cash Back service | by Crypto Cash Back | Medium (Dec 28, 2022)
- ↑ cryptocashback.org - urlscan.io (Dec 28, 2022)
- ↑ Bitcoin price today, BTC live marketcap, chart, and info | CoinMarketCap (May 16, 2021)
- ↑ Ethereum Scam Database (Dec 28, 2022)
- ↑ Ethereum Scam Database (Dec 28, 2022)
- ↑ 2019 In Review: Major Blockchain/Crypto Security Incidents | MyCrypto Blog (Dec 28, 2022)
- ↑ Browser Extensions Can Pose Significant Cyber Security Threats - Security Boulevard (Dec 28, 2022)