BTC24H Claim System Contract Missing Eligibility Check

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Polygon Blockchain

BTC24H, a new ERC20 smart contract token launched on the Polygon blockchain, was compromised due to an access control vulnerability in its Lock contract. The flaw in the contract’s claim function allowed unauthorized users to claim BTC24H tokens after a specified date without verification of eligibility. This security breach led to an estimated loss of approximately $85,700 worth of tokens, as attackers exploited the vulnerability to drain the funds. The BTC24H project does not appear to have any social media or website, and it is unclear how the project is responding to the loss situation.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

About BTC24H

BTC24H is a new smart contract ERC20 token launched on the Polygon blockchain.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

  • When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
  • Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
  • How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
  • Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

"BTC24H (BTC24H) is suspected to have been attacked on Polygon, with an estimated loss of $85,700."

Key Event Timeline - BTC24H Claim System Contract Missing Eligibility Check
Date Event Description
December 11th, 2024 9:23:06 AM MST BTC24H Contract Created The BTC24H smart contract is first created.
December 16th, 2024 10:31:18 AM MST Polygon Transaction The BTC24H smart contract is exploited on the Polygon block chain.
December 16th, 2024 7:26:00 PM MST TenArmor Tweet Posted TenArmor posts an overall summary of the incident and the cause.
December 24th, 2024 6:35:00 AM MST 0xCommit Twitter Post 0xCommit includes the BTC24H attack in a list of compromises for the past week.
December 30th, 2024 9:37:00 AM MST Inclusion In IncentiveFi List The incident is included in the "latest hacks rundown" which is put together and published on Twitter/X by IncentiveFi. It's attributed to "a loss of ~$85.7K".

Technical Details

"An access control flaw on Polygon led to a loss of ~$85.7K. Attacker exploited the smart contract’s vulnerability to drain tokens"

"The Lock contract's claim function does not check if msg.sender is eligible to claim. This flaw enables anyone to claim BTC24H tokens after the specified date."

Total Amount Lost

Most source report $85.7k was lost.

The total amount lost has been estimated at $86,000 USD.

Immediate Reactions

"BTC24H (BTC24H) is suspected to have been attacked on Polygon, with an estimated loss of $85,700."

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.

References