AIRWA Access Control Public Burn Rate Function Exploited

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Binance Security Image

The $AIRWA token on Binance Smart Chain was exploited due to a critical vulnerability in its smart contract. Launched just a day earlier, the contract lacked access control on its setBurnRate() function, allowing anyone to change the token’s burn rate. The attacker exploited this flaw to manipulate the tokenomics and trade ~12 AIRWA for ~57 BNB (worth approximately $33.6K). The project has not issued any public response, and there is no indication of recovery efforts. The stolen funds appear to be permanently lost.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]

About AIRWA Token

The AIRWA smart contract/token was created in the morning of April 3rd, 2025.

The Reality

Unfortunately, the contract was launched with a lack of access control on the setBurnRate function, allowing funds to be drained.

What Happened

The $AIRWA token was exploited due to a missing access control on the setBurnRate() function, allowing an attacker to manipulate tokenomics and steal approximately $33.6K in BNB.

Key Event Timeline - AIRWA Access Control Public Burn Rate Function Exploited
Date Event Description
April 3rd, 2025 10:12:26 AM MDT AIRWA Contract Created The AIRWA smart contract was first created.
April 3rd, 2025 8:33:05 PM MDT Attack Transaction Mined The attack transaction is accepted to be processed on the Binance Smart Chain.
April 4th, 2025 2:14:00 AM MDT CertiK Alert Posted CertiK posts an alert on Twitter/X with details of the exploit.
April 4th, 2025 3:15:00 AM MDT TenArmor Posts Announcement TenArmor posts an update regarding a suspicious attack transaction suspected to be related to AIRWA.

Technical Details

The exploit of the $AIRWA token on the Binance Smart Chain (BSC) on April 4th stemmed from a critical access control vulnerability in the token's smart contract. Specifically, the contract exposed a public setBurnRate() function, which allowed any user to arbitrarily modify the burn rate of the token — a parameter that controls how much of the token is destroyed or removed from circulation during transfers or conversions.

The attacker exploited this flaw by calling setBurnRate() and setting the burn rate to a maliciously high or strategic value. This manipulation altered the internal tokenomics, allowing the attacker to trade a very small amount of $AIRWA (about 12 AIRWA tokens) and extract a disproportionately large amount of BNB — roughly 57 BNB, worth around $34,000 at the time. Because this function should have been restricted to the contract owner or admin, the lack of proper access control was the root cause of the vulnerability.

The attack involved three key addresses:

Attacker’s wallet: 0x70f0406e0A50C53304194B2668Ec853D664a3D9C

Attack contract: 0x2a011580f1b1533006967bd6dc63af7ae5c82363

Targeted AIRWA contract (non-open source): 0x3af7da38c9f68df9549ce1980eef4ac6b635223a

Total Amount Lost

TenArmor has reported the amount lost as $33.6k USD.

The total amount lost has been estimated at $34,000 USD.

Immediate Reactions

The incident was reported by third parties such as TenArmor, CertiK, and GoPlus. However, there is no indication that this project has issued any response.

Ultimate Outcome

There were some public news reports. There is no indication of any investigation or recovery effort by the project.

Total Amount Recovered

There is no indication that any funds have been recovered.

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

Ongoing Developments

The funds appear to be permanently gone.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.

References