Mars Stealer Malware

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Mars Stealer

Mars Stealer is a new form of malware released last summer, which is gaining popularity. Once a user is tricked into installing it, it has the capacity to steal from a massive list of cryptocurrency wallets and extensions you may have installed. If you are affected, there are very limited means by which lost cryptocurrency can be recovered.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Mars Stealer

"According to security researcher 3xp0rt, Mars stealer is an advanced upgrade of the 2019 Oski Trojan and can loot cryptocurrency stored in people’s wallets by attacking the wallets’ browser extensions." "About July 2020 Oski support stopped responding to buyers and deleted the telegram account and bot. It should alert because such large projects don’t disappear so simply (e.g. KPOT Stealer, Predator The Thief)." "Fast forward almost a year later, and a new information-stealing malware called 'Mars Stealer' began to be promoted on Russian-speaking hacking forums."

"The Trojan malware began circulating on Russian-speaking hacking forums in the summer of 2021" "After security researcher @3xp0rt obtained a sample, the researcher discovered that the Mars Stealer is a redesigned version of Oski malware with enhanced functionality." "But when I’ve found a sample of the Mars Stealer, I noticed that it was just an improved copy of the Oski Stealer." "Currently, Mars Stealer is sold for $140 to $160 (extended version) on hacking forums, so it will likely get in the hands of numerous threat actors and be used in attacks in the future."

"The Mars stealer is a lightweight malicious program. Hence, it does not strain the compromised OS (Operating System), which means that there are no obvious signs of infection (e.g., significant decrease in response/operation time, system crashes, etc.)." “Mars Stealer written in ASM/C with using WinApi, weight is 95 kb. Uses special techniques to hide WinApi calls, encrypts strings, collects information in the memory, supports secure SSL-connection with C&C, doesn’t use CRT, STD.” "Mars Stealer is known to invade the extensions of wallets by spreading through numerous channels, including file-hosting websites, torrent clients, and dubious websites." It "relies on its own loader and wiper, which minimizes the infection footprint."

"Mars Stealer uses a custom grabber to retrieve its configuration from the command and control infrastructure and then proceeds to target application data from popular web browsers, two-factor authentication plugins, and multiple cryptocurrency extensions and wallets." "So far, it has been found to attack 40+ different browser-based wallets." "Once it enters the crypto wallet extension, the malware then performs the theft by sabotaging the wallet’s personal keys and security features and later exits the extension after deleting any visible traces of the theft."

"Browser extension list: Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge, Kometa, Amigo, Torch, Orbitium, Comodo Dragon, Nichrome, Maxxthon5, Maxxthon6, Sputnik Browser, Epic Privacy Browser, Vivaldi, CocCoc, Uran Browser, QIP Surf, Cent Browser, Elements Browser, TorBro Browser, CryptoTab Browser, Brave, Opera Stable, Opera GX, Opera Neon, Firefox, SlimBrowser, PaleMoon, Waterfox, CyberFox, BlackHawk, IceCat, K-Meleon, Thunderbird."

"Crypto extension list: TronLink, MetaMask, Binance Chain Wallet, Yoroi, Nifty Wallet, Math Wallet, Coinbase Wallet, Guarda, EQUAL Wallet, Jaox Liberty, BitAppWllet, iWallet, Wombat, MEW CX, Guild Wallet, Saturn Wallet, Ronin Wallet, Neoline, Clover Wallet, Liquality Wallet, Terra Station, Keplr, Sollet, Auro Wallet, Polymesh Wallet, ICONex, Nabox Wallet, KHC, Temple, TezBox Cyano Wallet, Byone, OneKey, Leaf Wallet, DAppPlay, BitClip, Steem Keychain, Nash Extension."

"Wallets targeted: Bitcoin Core, Ethereum, Electrum, Electrum LTC, Exodus, Electron Cash, MultiDoge, JAXX, Atomic, Binance, Coinomi."

"2FA plugins targeted: Authenticator, Authy, EOS Authenticator, GAuth Authenticator, Trezor Password Manager."

"What’s particularly concerning about Mars Stealer is its ability to navigate the wallet’s security features. For example, it can use a “grabber function” to steal private keys even if 2FA is enabled. This makes it a particularly dangerous threat for anyone holding crypto assets."

"Mars Stealer is a lean malware of just 95 KB in size, which attempts to evade security by using routines that hide API calls and string-encryption techniques using a combination of RC4 and Base64. The information it collects is wrapped in memory, while all connections with the C2 are done with the SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol, so they’re encrypted. Moreover, the Mars Stealer code contains Sleep function intervals to perform timing checks that would result in a mismatch if a debugger is used. Finally, the malware can remove itself after the user data has been exfiltrated or when the operator decides to wipe it."

"Mars Stealer can also extract valuable information concerning processor model, computer name, machine ID, GUID, installed software and their versions, user name, and domain computer name." "The only notable omission from the targeted application list is Outlook, which the malware authors will likely add in future releases."

"Another interesting feature of this malware is that Mars Stealer performs a prior check on a user’s country of origin to check whether the user belongs to a commonwealth of independent states. If a user’s ID belongs to countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, the program will not perform any negative activity and will exit the application."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - Mars Stealer Malware

Date	Event	Description
February 1st, 2022	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost is unknown.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

As a user, be careful what software you download and install on your computer. You can also use a malware detection software to scan any downloaded files. Only install information from a trusted source directly and double check you are at the correct URL. The most secure form of storage for cryptocurrency is offline storage on paper or a hardware wallet, and that's where the majority of funds should be stored.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.