Mars Stealer Malware

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Mars Stealer

Mars Stealer is a new form of malware released last summer, which is gaining popularity. Once a user is tricked into installing it, it has the capacity to steal from a massive list of cryptocurrency wallets and extensions you may have installed. If you are affected, there are very limited means by which lost cryptocurrency can be recovered.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Mars Stealer

Mars stealer has been attaching itself to software since the summer of 2021.

The Mars stealer is a lightweight malicious program which is 95kB in size. It does not strain the compromised operating system, and leaves no obvious signs of infection.

TBD - More on how people would download this malware. Hopefully some specific cases of compelling sales pitches for software that contains the malware.

The Reality

"According to security researcher 3xp0rt, Mars stealer is an advanced upgrade of the 2019 Oski Trojan and can loot cryptocurrency stored in people’s wallets by attacking the wallets’ browser extensions." "About July 2020 Oski support stopped responding to buyers and deleted the telegram account and bot. It should alert because such large projects don’t disappear so simply (e.g. KPOT Stealer, Predator The Thief)." "Fast forward almost a year later, and a new information-stealing malware called 'Mars Stealer' began to be promoted on Russian-speaking hacking forums."

"The Trojan malware began circulating on Russian-speaking hacking forums in the summer of 2021" "After security researcher @3xp0rt obtained a sample, the researcher discovered that the Mars Stealer is a redesigned version of Oski malware with enhanced functionality." "But when I’ve found a sample of the Mars Stealer, I noticed that it was just an improved copy of the Oski Stealer." "Currently, Mars Stealer is sold for $140 to $160 (extended version) on hacking forums, so it will likely get in the hands of numerous threat actors and be used in attacks in the future."

a new type of malware called Mars Stealer is targeting browser extension wallets like MetaMask, with the potential to steal sensitive information such as wallet addresses and private keys. The malware specifically targets crypto wallets that function via a browser extension, such as Metamask or Binance Chain Wallet. It is a continuation of the 2019 trojan malware 'Oski' and targets browser extensions, private key info, and even 2FA plugins. The Mars Stealer malware is currently being sold on the dark web for just $140. To prevent falling victim to this malware, users should exercise caution when clicking on links, be wary of phishing emails and dubious download websites, and only download software from legitimate and legal sources. It is important to stay vigilant and inform others about potential threats in the online crypto space.

What Happened

The Mars stealer malware started circulating in the summer of 2021, and has been used to drain many individual hot wallets.

Key Event Timeline - Mars Stealer Malware

Date	Event	Description
February 1st, 2022	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
February 4th, 2022 8:48:00 AM MST	Ledger Tweet	Ledger posts a tweet referencing the Mars Stealer.
February 9th, 2022 5:00:00 PM MST	Anycoin Article Published	Anycoin reports that a new type of malware called Mars Stealer is targeting browser extension wallets like MetaMask, with the potential to steal sensitive information such as wallet addresses and private keys. The malware specifically targets crypto wallets that function via a browser extension, such as Metamask or Binance Chain Wallet. It is a continuation of the 2019 trojan malware 'Oski' and targets browser extensions, private key info, and even 2FA plugins. The Mars Stealer malware is currently being sold on the dark web for just $140. To prevent falling victim to this malware, users should exercise caution when clicking on links, be wary of phishing emails and dubious download websites, and only download software from legitimate and legal sources. It is important to stay vigilant and inform others about potential threats in the online crypto space.

Technical Details

“Mars Stealer written in ASM/C with using WinApi, weight is 95 kb. Uses special techniques to hide WinApi calls, encrypts strings, collects information in the memory, supports secure SSL-connection with C&C, doesn’t use CRT, STD.” "Mars Stealer is known to invade the extensions of wallets by spreading through numerous channels, including file-hosting websites, torrent clients, and dubious websites." It "relies on its own loader and wiper, which minimizes the infection footprint."

"Mars Stealer uses a custom grabber to retrieve its configuration from the command and control infrastructure and then proceeds to target application data from popular web browsers, two-factor authentication plugins, and multiple cryptocurrency extensions and wallets." "So far, it has been found to attack 40+ different browser-based wallets." "Once it enters the crypto wallet extension, the malware then performs the theft by sabotaging the wallet’s personal keys and security features and later exits the extension after deleting any visible traces of the theft."

"Browser extension list: Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge, Kometa, Amigo, Torch, Orbitium, Comodo Dragon, Nichrome, Maxxthon5, Maxxthon6, Sputnik Browser, Epic Privacy Browser, Vivaldi, CocCoc, Uran Browser, QIP Surf, Cent Browser, Elements Browser, TorBro Browser, CryptoTab Browser, Brave, Opera Stable, Opera GX, Opera Neon, Firefox, SlimBrowser, PaleMoon, Waterfox, CyberFox, BlackHawk, IceCat, K-Meleon, Thunderbird."

"Crypto extension list: TronLink, MetaMask, Binance Chain Wallet, Yoroi, Nifty Wallet, Math Wallet, Coinbase Wallet, Guarda, EQUAL Wallet, Jaox Liberty, BitAppWllet, iWallet, Wombat, MEW CX, Guild Wallet, Saturn Wallet, Ronin Wallet, Neoline, Clover Wallet, Liquality Wallet, Terra Station, Keplr, Sollet, Auro Wallet, Polymesh Wallet, ICONex, Nabox Wallet, KHC, Temple, TezBox Cyano Wallet, Byone, OneKey, Leaf Wallet, DAppPlay, BitClip, Steem Keychain, Nash Extension."

"Wallets targeted: Bitcoin Core, Ethereum, Electrum, Electrum LTC, Exodus, Electron Cash, MultiDoge, JAXX, Atomic, Binance, Coinomi."

"2FA plugins targeted: Authenticator, Authy, EOS Authenticator, GAuth Authenticator, Trezor Password Manager."

"What’s particularly concerning about Mars Stealer is its ability to navigate the wallet’s security features. For example, it can use a “grabber function” to steal private keys even if 2FA is enabled. This makes it a particularly dangerous threat for anyone holding crypto assets."

"Mars Stealer is a lean malware of just 95 KB in size, which attempts to evade security by using routines that hide API calls and string-encryption techniques using a combination of RC4 and Base64. The information it collects is wrapped in memory, while all connections with the C2 are done with the SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol, so they’re encrypted. Moreover, the Mars Stealer code contains Sleep function intervals to perform timing checks that would result in a mismatch if a debugger is used. Finally, the malware can remove itself after the user data has been exfiltrated or when the operator decides to wipe it."

"Mars Stealer can also extract valuable information concerning processor model, computer name, machine ID, GUID, installed software and their versions, user name, and domain computer name." "The only notable omission from the targeted application list is Outlook, which the malware authors will likely add in future releases."

"Another interesting feature of this malware is that Mars Stealer performs a prior check on a user’s country of origin to check whether the user belongs to a commonwealth of independent states. If a user’s ID belongs to countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, the program will not perform any negative activity and will exit the application."

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost is unknown.

Immediate Reactions

TBD

Ultimate Outcome

TBD

Total Amount Recovered

It is unclear if there have been any funds lost in this case.

Ongoing Developments

TBD

Individual Prevention Policies

As a cryptocurrency user (and general computer user) you should exercise care with the software you download and install on your computer. While you can use malware detection software to scan downloaded files, the best practice is to avoid downloading it in the first place. Only install tools from trusted sources directly, verify each download using the hash, and double check you are at the correct website.

Any time untrusted software is being run is an opportunity for abuse. It is recommended to always interact with cryptocurrency in a fully controlled environment, which is an environment where you have understanding of every piece of software running there. Using a hardware wallet, spare computer with all software wiped, and/or virtual machine with only the needed software greatly reduces your attack surface. Take the time to verify downloaded files come from the correct and expected source and match available hashes if provided. Any time you encounter a new file, always check if it can contain executable code prior to using it.

The most secure form of storage for cryptocurrency is offline storage on paper or a hardware wallet, and that's where the majority of funds should be stored. When you need to use funds, you can withdraw only what you need.

Store the majority of funds offline. By offline, it means that the private key and/or seed phrase is exclusively held by you and not connected to any networked device. Examples of offline storage include paper wallets (seed phrase or key written down and deleted from all electronic media), hardware wallets, steel wallet devices, etc...

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

This case does not appear to have resulted in a loss to any platform. Platforms can better educate users and work towards an industry insurance fund which could assist victims.

Never take for granted the limited knowledge of users of your service and their tendency to skip past provided information. It is recommended to design a simple tutorial and quiz for new users which explains the basics of seed phrases, strong password generation, secure two-factor authentication, common fraud schemes, how ponzi schemes work, as well as other risks which are unique to the cryptocurrency space. This tutorial and quiz should ensure their understanding and be a standard part of the sign-up or download process which is difficult or impossible to skip.

Work with other industry platforms to set up a multi-signature wallet with private keys held separately by delegate signatories from seven prominent platforms and services within the industry. Establish requirements for contributions by all platforms and services, designed to be affordable for small platforms yet large enough to cover anticipated breach events. Any breach event can be brought forth by a member platform or a petition of 100 signatures for consideration by the delegate signatories. A vote of 4 or more delegate signatures is required to release any funds, which could partially or fully restore lost funds based on their assessment.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

Greater education for cryptocurrency users could help prevent their accidental installation of malware, and assist them with establishing better fund security.

Create a standard tutorial and quiz for all new cryptocurrency participants, which is required to be completed once per participant. This tutorial and quiz should cover the basics of proper seed phrase protection, strong password generation, secure two-factor authentication, common fraud schemes, how to detect and guard against phishing attacks, how ponzi schemes work, as well as other risks which are unique to the cryptocurrency space.

Set up a multi-signature wallet with private keys held separately by delegate signatories from seven prominent platforms and services within the industry. Establish requirements for contributions by all platforms and services within the country, designed to be affordable for small platforms yet large enough to cover anticipated breach events. Any breach event can be brought forth by a member platform or a petition of 100 signatures for consideration by the delegate signatories. A vote of 4 or more delegate signatures is required to release any funds, which could partially or fully restore lost funds based on their assessment.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.