IVest DAO Smart Contract Transfer Vulnerability
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The iVest DAO is a community equity and investment ecosystem. They provide a source of passive income for holders of the token. An exploit was present in their smart contract which allowed an attacker to profit by donating funds to a burn address. A significant amount was drained from the smart contract. The team has yet to acknowledge the exploit or prepare any path forward.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]
About iVest DAO
"The iVest DAO is a bootstrapping web3 powered decentralized community equity & investment ecosystem.
We combine SocialFi and DAO governance with unique tokenomics to support our members and create thriving community projects."
"Grassroots Fair Launch. No Pre-Sale, No Dev Tokens, No ICO, No Referrals. Launched with 100% community donated liquidity.
Fees collected from transactions and DAO related activities are shared as rewards to token holders and DAO contributors.
The combined effects of the Vesting Pool and fee schedule promotes an antifragile, deflationary ecosystem.
Holders passively earn more tokens while iVEST circulating supply dwindles... Sellers wait for locked tokens to exit their position smoothing price action, limiting dumps, panic & manipulation."
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
"iVest DAO was attacked due to a smart contract vulnerability, resulting in a loss of approximately $172,000."
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| August 11th, 2024 10:52:39 PM MDT | Blockchain Transaction | The blockchain transaction which attacks the iVest DAO, according to Olympix and Ancilia, Inc. |
| August 11th, 2024 11:38:00 PM MDT | Ancilia Inc. Tweet Posted | Ancilia posts a tweet with details of the transaction and |
| August 12th, 2024 12:41:17 AM MDT | Blockchain Transaction | The blockchain transaction which attacks the iVest DAO, according to QuillAudits. |
| August 12th, 2024 12:52:00 AM MDT | SlowMist Tweets | SlowMist tweets to report about "suspicious activity". in this smart contract. No transaction ID is provided. |
| August 12th, 2024 1:46:00 AM MDT | ExVul Tweet | ExVul tweets to report on the malicious transaction further. |
| August 12th, 2024 3:14:00 AM MDT | Olympix Tweet | The Olympix team tweets to report about the malicious transaction. |
| August 12th, 2024 3:48:00 AM MDT | QuillAudits Tweet Post | QuillAudits posts an description of the exploit and transactions. |
Technical Details
"The exploit centers around a vulnerability in the token contract’s transfer function.
The transfer function contains flawed logic: when tokens are transferred to the burn address (0x0), the sender’s balance is incorrectly reduced by double the intended amount."
"The attacker took advantage of this by transferring iVest tokens to a Uniswap pair and then calling skim(0x0) and sync().
Due to the flawed transfer logic, the pair’s balance was drastically reduced."
"By repeatedly exploiting this flaw, the attacker managed to drain the liquidity pool, resulting in the loss of $156,309.94."
"root case is wrong implement of _transfer 0 address, when transfer to 0 addrees, `makeDonation` funciton will be called , and decrease part of sender token amounts, the issue is when call `skim` , pancke pair amount will decrease, this will increase the value of `iVest Token` ,attacker call multiple times skim and then swap to drain pair weth"
Total Amount Lost
QuillAudits: $156,309.94 Olympix: $172,000 ExVul: $205,153
The total amount lost has been estimated at $172,000 USD.
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
The iVest team does not appear to have even acknowledged the exploit yet.
Total Amount Recovered
The total amount recovered is unknown.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ @SlowMist_Team Twitter (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ iVESTDAO | Address 0x786fcf76dc44b29845f284b81f5680b6c47302c6 | BscScan (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ iVest.finance (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ https://ivest.finance/media/litepaper.pdf (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ BNB Smart Chain Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | BscScan (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ @Olympix_ai Twitter (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ BNB Smart Chain Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | BscScan (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ @AnciliaInc Twitter (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ @EXVULSEC Twitter (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)
- ↑ @quillaudits_ai Twitter (Accessed Aug 12, 2024)