FENGSHOU (NGFS) DelegateCallReserves Attack

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It is unclear the intent behind the launch of the NGFS (FENGSHOU) token, however it most likely wasn't to give an attacker full access to take all of the liquidity. A couple days after the token launched on April 23rd, an exploit took advantage of a delegateCallReserves vulnerability, which allowed the attacker to set whatever library smart contract he wanted, including a malicious one which transferred all the liquidity to themselves.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About FENGSHOU (NGFS)

"Shortly after the deployment of the FENGSHOU (NGFS) token, it was attacked, resulting in a loss of approximately $191,000. The vulnerability lies in a public `delegateCallReserves` function which allows the attacker to set an arbitrary address to a UniSwapV2 proxy."

"The FENGSHOU (NGFS) Token was hacked shortly after deployment. The attack was a simple 3-step process which was possible because the deployer didn't initialize the contract properly.

1. The attacker called `delegateCallReserves` which sets the uniswapV2Proxy to msg.sender."

"2. Then it was easy for the attacker to set the `_uniswapV2Library` to any address he wants and to be able to call the third critical function."

"3. The `reserveMultiSync` allowed him to sync(transfer) all of the funds from the PancakeSwap BSC-USD - NGFS pool to his address. And just like that ~$191k has been affected."

"The data of the token and the pair are no longer updated as the token is SCAM" "Very high start liquidity, it looks like a scam!"

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

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• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - FENGSHOU (NGFS) DelegateCallReserves Attack

Date	Event	Description
April 23rd, 2024 3:45:54 AM MDT	Smart Contract Creation	The vulnerable smart contract is first created.
April 25th, 2024 5:18:05 AM MDT	Exploit Transaction	The exploit transaction happenc on the Binance Smart Chain.
April 26th, 2024 1:53:37 AM MDT	Smart Contract Recreated	The NGFS smart contract is recreated at a new blockchain address.
April 26th, 2024 2:33:00 AM MDT	ImmuneBytes Analysis	ImmuneBytes publishes an analysis of the exploit including the transaction and the cause in a Tweet.
April 26th, 2024 8:20:00 AM MDT	ListingSpy Scam Report	ListingSpy claims the new version of the token is a scam, due to the high starting liquidity.
April 27th, 2024 8:08:00 AM MDT	Technical Analysis Published	ddimitrov22 publishes a technical analysis of the FENGSHOU exploit, which is attributed to a simple failure to initialize the smart contract correctly.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $190,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.