FortuneWheel swapProfitFees Access Control Issue
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FortuneWheel is a project on the Binance Smart Chain launched in June 2023, identified as an "old unknown project contract." The vulnerability lies in its "swapProfitFees()" function, which facilitates token exchanges using PancakeSwap but lacks an access modifier and slippage protection, making it vulnerable to manipulation. A hacker exploited this weakness by swapping a large amount of WBNB for LINK, then using the function to swap LINK back to WBNB, ultimately making a profit of nearly $21,000 through price manipulation.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
About FortuneWheel
FortuneWheel is an "old unknown project contract" on the Binance Smart Chain which was created in June 2023.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
"A contract named "FortuneWheel" was exploited due to public swap functionality."
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| June 16th, 2023 8:08:38 PM MDT | FortuneWheel Smart Contract Launch | The FortuneWheel smart contract is first launched on Binance Smart Chain. |
| January 10th, 2025 2:40:01 AM MST | FortuneWheel Exploit Transaction | The FortuneWheel smart contract on Binance Smart Chain is exploited. |
| January 10th, 2025 2:51:00 AM MST | TenArmor Alert Posted | TenArmor posts an analysis on their Twitter/X with details of the exploit transaction and cause. |
| January 10th, 2025 10:18:00 AM MST | @ACai_sec Blog Post | Twitter user @ACai_sec shares a blog post with an additional analysis and breakdown of events. |
| January 10th, 2025 10:57:00 AM MST | Tikkala Research Twitter/X Post | Tikkala research posts about the exploit. |
| January 10th, 2025 7:29:00 PM MST | Nick L. Franklin Twitter/X | Nick L. Franklin posts about the exploit to Twitter/X. He has information about the exploit on his site. |
Technical Details
"The root cause is the swapProfitFees() function which will add BNB to a swap and attack could gain from the K change."
"“swapProfitFees” function exchanges tokens using pancakeswap and has no [access] modifier."
"this is a classic case of price manipulation. The swapProfitFees() function lacks slippage protection and is easily manipulated by a swap."
"Hacker exchanged a huge amount of WBNB to LINK, then called this function, exchanged LINK to WBNB again. He gained almost $21k."
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $22,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ FortuneWheel Smart Contract Exploited (Accessed Feb 13, 2025)
- ↑ @TikkalaResearch Twitter (Accessed Feb 13, 2025)
- ↑ @0xNickLFranklin Twitter (Accessed Feb 13, 2025)
- ↑ Sandwich attack! – Defi hack analysis (Accessed Feb 13, 2025)
- ↑ FortuneWheel Smart Contract Creation (Accessed Feb 13, 2025)
- ↑ @TenArmorAlert Twitter (Accessed Feb 13, 2025)
- ↑ @ACai_sec Twitter (Accessed Feb 13, 2025)
- ↑ 20250110-FortuneWheel 攻击事件：竟然不设滑点，那就体验一下 Force Investment 吧 - ACai_sec - 博客园 (Accessed Feb 13, 2025)