GAGAW Contract Flawed Token Transfer Logic Exploited
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The GAGAW token was launched in a new smart contract on the Binance smart chain on November 23rd. Unfortunately, there was a vulnerability in the token transfer logic, which was later exploited on December 2nd. This resulted in a loss of roughly $70k. It's unclear where the GAGAW community resides, or what their response has been. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
About GAGAW
GAGAW is a token launched on the Binance smart chain.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
"The GAGAW (GAGAW) on BSC is suspected to have been attacked, resulting in a loss of approximately $70K."
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| November 23rd, 2024 9:05:59 AM MST | GAGAW Smart Contract Created | The GAGAW smart contract was first created on the Binance smart chain. |
| December 2nd, 2024 10:28:21 AM MST | Binance Smart Chain Attack | The attack transaction is accepted to the Binance Smart Chain. |
| December 2nd, 2024 5:26:00 PM MST | TenArmor Tweet Posted | The TenArmor security team posts a tweet about the exploit at a high level, with losses estimated at $70k. |
| December 2nd, 2024 8:05:00 PM MST | TenArmor Analysis | TenArmor completes a further analysis of the exploit and shares a detailed breakdown of the exploit. |
| December 9th, 2024 11:33:00 PM MST | Nick L Franklin Posts | Nick L Franklin posts an analysis of the exploit. |
| December 16th, 2024 11:51:00 AM MST | 0xCommit Summary Inclusion | The exploit is included along with many others in a "Weekly hack track" put together by 0xCommit. |
Technical Details
"The primary issue lies in the flawed accounting logic within the token's transfer function.
When a transfer is mistakenly identified as a removeLiquidity action, the recipient’s balance is increased by the balance of the 0xdead address.
This allowed the attacker to repeatedly simulate removeLiquidity transfers, accumulating a significant amount of tokens effortlessly.
It's unclear what the true intent behind this logic is—perhaps a simple typo or even a deliberate backdoor?
Additionally, the decision logic for removeLiquidity and addLiquidity can be manipulated through token transfers.
Despite restrictions on buying and selling, the attacker bypassed these limitations by simulating addLiquidity transfers, ultimately securing profit.
Interestingly, the attacker deposited the profits into a pre-created Uniswap pair."
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $70,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
"Our system has detected a suspicious attack involving #GAGAW on #BSC, resulting in an approximately loss of $69.7K."
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ BNB Smart Chain Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | BscScan (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)
- ↑ GAGAW/USDT Real-time On-chain PancakeSwap v2 (BSC) DEX Data (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)
- ↑ https://apespace.io/bsc/0x3ee9934da662ccf3cbb087cf096ef9e28ecbe017 (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)
- ↑ @TenArmorAlert Twitter (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)
- ↑ @0xCommitAudits Twitter (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)
- ↑ @0xNickLFranklin Twitter (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)
- ↑ GAGAW token exploit. – Defi hack analysis (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)
- ↑ GAGAW exploiter | Address 0x86c5e027ffd8868278e1e113f65571055a10951c | BscScan (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)
- ↑ BNB Smart Chain Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | BscScan (Accessed Jan 20, 2025)