DeversiFi Launch Exploit
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The first version of the DiversiFi platform imposed an order limit, however when a transaction failed it would be retried automatically. This resulted in a degredation to the speed with which other orders were processed. There don't appear to have been any funds lost. DeversiFi has since rebranded their project as Rhino Finance.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
About DeversiFi
"D[e]versiFi is a decentralized exchange platform, which was audited by PeckShield."
"Our decentralised exchange is the easiest way to access DeFi opportunities on Ethereum: invest, trade, and send tokens without paying gas fees." "We’ve got a suite of tools to help you make the most of DeFi. From managing your crypto portfolio, to trading, swapping and sending assets and tokens and even putting your investments to work earning you rewards and interest."
"Getting started with DeversiFi couldn't be simpler, whether you’re a crypto ninja or just starting out, our DEX really is the simplest way to access all the opportunities of decentralised finance."
"The core smart-contracts employed by DeversiFi to secure customer funds on the Ethereum blockchain were designed and deployed by StarkWare Industries. StarkWare are leaders in the field of cryptography and blockchain systems. [An] independent audit report was made by PeckShield."
"The new version of DeversiFi encountered a vulnerability in less than a week after it was launched. The official said that it would be fixed as soon as possible. The cause of this vulnerability was that a trader tried to submit an order larger than the limit, and the logic of why the system designed order limit is to avoid user's misoperation. After that, the system still repeatedly submitted the order, but it was continuously rejected by the system, which affected the processing of other orders."
"Over a 20 minute period in the early hours of Wednesday 10th June UTC five DeversiFi traders encountered an issue where submitted orders were not executed immediately and therefore their balances did not immediately clear."
"The cause of the overnight issue was a trader trying to place an order that was greater than the maximum order size allowed for a particular pair. Maximum order sizes are fixed for each pair in proportion to the token market size and are to help protect traders against ‘fat finger’ or ‘mis click’ trades."
"The maximum order size bug was not something that we had run into frequently during testing as we were testing using ETH/USDt and wBTC/USDT markets, which have very large maximum order sizes. The error unfortunately resulted in the trader’s balances not showing as cleared in the U.I This is because the system was continually trying to place the large order, but was continually rejected."
"This bug unfortunately caused knock-on problems with some other order processing. The good news is that this is an easy error to handle, our developers are working on the solution and it will be implemented shortly."
"From the entire DeversiFi team, please accept our apologies." "All of the issues relating to this error have been cleared save for two impacted traders. We are being extra cautious with the fix and for proper diligence, want to make sure it is properly implemented and fully tested. If you are one of the two remaining impacted traders, please reach out to @RossMidd on Telegram or at submit a support ticket at support.deversifi.com"
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| June 10th, 2020 12:00:00 AM | First Event | This is an expanded description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost is unknown.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
It is unknown how much was recovered.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Prevention Policies
References
SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone (Jun 25)
Decentralized Cryptocurrency Exchange | Ethereum Exchange | DeversiFi (Oct 12)
Smart Contract Audit Report | DeversiFi (Oct 12)
DiversiFi, Formerly Ethfinex, Launches Its DEX 2.0 With Starkware; Processing 9,000 + TPS (Dec 10)
DeversiFi Platform Performance Issues Wednesday 10th June | DeversiFi (Dec 11)