MonoSwap Malicious Kakao Call Software
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MonoSwap is a liquidity provider on the Blast smart chain. On or before July 24th, the team was approached by what was believed to be a venture capital fund to install Kakao Chat software for their meeting. Instead of legitimate meeting software, this software contrained malware that allowed the computer to be remotely controlled and exploited. This remote access was used to obtain private key information from the protocol, which was used to withdraw all funds. Funds were promptly converted and transfered to TornadoCash.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17]
About MonoSwap
"MonoSwap represents a meticulously crafted ecosystem-centric, yield-driven Decentralized Exchange (DEX) and Launchpad seamlessly integrated with the robust Blast framework.
Distinguished by its highly efficient and customizable protocol, MonoSwap provides builders and users alike with the unparalleled ability to harness our bespoke infrastructure, fostering deep, sustainable, and adaptable liquidity. Going beyond conventional DEX designs, MonoSwap stands out by offering a uniquely tailored approach that places a premium on composability, redefining the landscape of decentralized financial solutions."
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| July 24th, 2024 8:35:35 AM MDT | Funds Converted To Ethereum | The stolen funds are converted into eEtheruem in the attacker's wallet. |
| July 24th, 2024 9:53:00 AM MDT | Cyvers Alerts Tweet | The Cyvers team tweets reporting the detection of multiple suspicious transactions originating from the MonoSwap smart contracts. At this point, they have already attributed the loss to a phishing app, and funds are already sent to TornadoCash. |
| July 24th, 2024 10:09:00 AM MDT | ChainAegis Tweet | ChainAegis reposts in response to the original tweet from the team. |
| July 24th, 2024 10:42:00 AM MDT | Second Twitter Post | The MonoSwap team reposts on Twitter to admit their screw-up with clicking a phishing link and installing malicious voice calling software. This time, the phishing link is not clickable in the post. |
| July 25th, 2024 7:15:00 AM MDT | Deploying New Smart Contracts | The MonoSwap team announces that they are planning the deployment of new smart contracts to replace the vulnerable ones (given that the private keys have been exposed). |
| July 30th, 2024 3:11:00 AM MDT | Recovery Plan Discussions | The team announces the redeployment on Twitter, and that they are still internally discussing potential recovery plans for affected users. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $1,300,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
"Blast ecosystem DEX MonoSwap disclosed on Twitter that the platform has been hacked. Users are advised not to add liquidity or stake. If you have any staking positions, please withdraw them immediately to avoid financial loss."
"Yesterday, one of our developers installed a phishing app to join a call with scammers who pretended to be a VC. The attackers installed the botnet into his office PC, which has access to all MonoSwap-related wallets and contracts. The hackers then withdrew most of the staked liquidity positions, causing damage to the protocol."
"The hacker has bridged the stolen funds from BLAST to Ethereum & already laundered 371 $ETH (worth ~$1.3 million) via #TornadoCash."
"ALERT: MonoSwap has been hacked. DO NOT add liquidity or stake in our farming pools at the moment.
If you have any staked positions, please withdraw immediately to avoid funds loss."
"We are investigating the attack right now and will soon announce the next moves. We were trying to work with VCs to build a better future for MonoSwap. However, unfortunate things happened and now we are trying our best to solve this issue."
Ultimate Outcome
"New contracts for our v2 + v3 AMMs were deployed and will be migrated to the UI in 48 hours.
We are working to deploy new contracts for Lottery, MonoChest, MonoPass, Dividends, MONO, and xMONO.
A snapshot was taken and users will receive newly deployed assets directly in their wallet. A detailed timeline will be published soon in our Discord.
For now, please withdraw all of your positions left on previous contracts.
We are having internal discussions on recovery plans for impacted users. Please stay tuned for more info in the coming time."
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone (Accessed Aug 8, 2024)
- ↑ Monoswap (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ ┃Overview | MonoSwap Docs (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @monoswapio Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @monoswapio Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @monoswapio Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @ZKaffein Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @NftCelestials Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @BSCNheadlines Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @ChainAegis Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @jina_coin Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ @De_FiSecurity Twitter (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ Blast protocol MonoSwap announces hack with link to attacker’s website (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ Monoswap: MUSD Token | Address 0x837fe561e9c5dfa73f607fda679295dbc2be5e40 | Blastscan (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)
- ↑ Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan (Accessed Aug 16, 2024)