MakerDAO Delegate aEthMKR Pendle USDe Phishing Attack
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One of the large delegates of the MakerDAO protocol accidentally signed a malicious transaction on a wallet with a reported $11m worth of assets, transferring those to an attacker. This was likely due to an impersonation account on Twitter, which was mimicking the main account of a prominent protocol. There is no word on who the victim was, and much less on the attacker or any efforts to recover the funds.[1][2]
About MakerDAO Delegates
"This delegate plays a key role in MakerDAO’s governance, contributing to vital decision-making processes that shape the protocol’s future."
"Delegates within MakerDAO are tasked with voting on various governance proposals, polls, and executive votes. Their influence is substantial, impacting major decisions within the Maker protocol.
These delegates, alongside MKR token holders, determine the outcomes of proposals that progress from initial discussions to final executive votes.
When a proposal gains approval, it is not immediately implemented. Instead, it enters a waiting period known as the Governance Security Module (GSM). This interval acts as a security buffer, preventing abrupt changes to the protocol and ensuring a period for reconsideration or potential veto."
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
"A high-ranking MakerDAO governance delegate has suffered a huge $11 million loss in a phishing scam involving Aave Ethereum Maker (aEthMKR) and Pendle USDe tokens."
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| June 22nd, 2024 3:50:11 PM MDT | Phishing Attack | The phishing attack is successful at taking $11m USD worth of assets in aEthMKR and Pendle USDe. |
| June 22nd, 2024 8:51:00 PM MDT | Scam Sniffer Tweet | Scam sniffer shares details of the events in a Twitter post which they make. |
| June 22nd, 2024 10:44:00 PM MDT | PeckShield Tweet | PeckShield tweets about the incident happening. |
| June 23rd, 2024 6:50:28 AM MDT | CoinTelegraph Article | The situation si reported on by CoinTelegraph. |
| July 4th, 2024 11:00:00 PM MDT | Included Notable Case | The phishing attack is included as a notable case in a list put together by realScamSniffers. |
| July 11th, 2024 12:13:00 PM MDT | Rekt.News Mentioning | A Rekt.News post mentions the attack as a notable phishing attack, with details provided of the transaction and a link to the scam sniffer post. |
Technical Details
"The heart of the phishing scam lies in the exploitation of an important figure within the MakerDAO system. The sender’s address, identified as “0xfb94d3404c1d3d9d6f08f79e58041d5ea95accfa,” dispatched 3,657 aEthMKR tokens to the recipient address “0x739772254924a57428272f429bd55f30eb36bb96.”
In an alarming 11 seconds, the transaction was confirmed, sealing the fate of the stolen assets."
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $11,000,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
"5 hours ago, a victim lost $11 million worth of aEthMKR and Pendle USDe tokens due to signing multiple Permit phishing signatures."
"Scam Sniffer detected the Scam in the early hours of June 23. The unsuspecting delegate fell prey to the phishing attack after signing multiple signatures, a series of actions that ultimately led to the unauthorized transfer of their crypto assets."
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ Rekt - Crypto's Achilles' Heel (Accessed Jul 12, 2024)
- ↑ @realScamSniffer Twitter (Accessed Jul 12, 2024)