GNUS.ai Discord Private Keys Exposed

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GNUS.ai

GNUS.ai aims to decentralize GPU utilization through their token. Unfortunately, that plan was set back somewhat when hackers were able to intercept Discord communication between team members which was intended to be private. After the hacker used private information to set up a fake contract, they could mint a large quantity of fake GNUS token and bridge this across to the Ethereum network where it could be liquidated. The protocol was ultimately able to retain the same smart contract address, and put in place different strategies to address the large supply created through the attack. The hacker was reportedly offered a 10% bounty for the fund returns but does not appear to have taken up the offer.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About GNUS.ai

"More than a Crypto Token. Genius (GNUS) tokens are at the heart of a unique and patented blockchain and software system. The primary GNUS token is a multichain asset that can be used for decentralized GPU utilization. Also known as DePIN (Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Networks)"

"Due to a recent exploit, a hacker was able to mint fake $GNUS tokens on Fantom, transfer via Axelar Bridge to Ethereum and Polygon, and sell into existing liquidity pools. We will be conducting a snapshot of the block preceding the exploit. To ensure fairness, please refrain from purchasing $GNUS tokens post-exploit, as we'll be issuing a new token. Stay tuned for further updates."

"Fantom ecosystem project GNUS fell victim to an attack, resulting in a loss of approximately $1.27 million. GNUS.ai posted on Twitter: “Due to a recent exploit, a hacker was able to mint fake GNUS tokens on Fantom, transfer them via Axelar Bridge to Ethereum and Polygon, and sell them into existing liquidity pools. We will be conducting a snapshot at the block preceding the exploit. To ensure fairness, please refrain from purchasing GNUS tokens post-exploit, as we'll be issuing a new token.”"

"The attacker was able to view team members’ private Discord messages, allowing them to gain access to the team’s wallet address and mint 100 million fake tokens."

"The exploit was executed by an attacker who managed to get the private key to a critical team account. This allowed them to create a fraudulent version of the GNUS token on the Fantom network using the Axelar bridge protocol. Thereafter, they minted 100 million counterfeit tokens, which were then sold on the Ethereum network, causing a big price drop and financial losses for existing token holders."

"The attacker obtained access to 0x18 which allowed them to copy the token manager's salt deployed on the eth and redeploy the token manager on Fantom."

"The attacker bridged 500k GNUS to Ethereum and sold it for 407 ETH (~$1.27m)."

"Following our recent AMA, we want to update you on our recovery path post-exploit. We've successfully secured the exploit, and all tokens are safe. Our underlying token contract remains secure, and we'll continue with the current CA.

We are addressing the surplus tokens minted during the hack through a company buyback and burn strategy."

"Gnus.ai has also launched a “white hat bounty worth 10% of the stolen funds”, which will hopefully result in the return of GNUS tokens."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - GNUS.ai Discord Private Keys Exposed

Date	Event	Description
May 5th, 2024 3:29:23 AM MDT	Ethereum Swap Transaction	The swap transaction selling the newly minted GNUS tokens.
May 6th, 2024 4:13:00 AM MDT	CertiK Analysis	CertiK posts a technical analysis of the exploit and the cause being a private key breach of the team wallet.
May 6th, 2024 2:23:39 PM MDT	Tweet Posted	The tweet has been posted and captured but of course the archive capture fails.
May 6th, 2024 4:36:00 PM MDT	New Strategy	The team posrts an updated strategy, which includes using the original smart contract address instead of upgrading.
May 7th, 2024 8:00:00 AM MDT	New Token Launch	In an article by CoinPaper, the project is reportedly planning a new token launch in the wake of the attack. (However, this is contradictory from the team's official update the day before.)
May 15th, 2024 12:02:00 PM MDT	Rebuys Accepting	In a new tweet, the team declares that anyone who sold their tokens immediately after the exploit can repurchase them in a special deal.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $1,270,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

"The Gnus.AI team also urged users to completely stop purchasing the old version of the token."

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

The total amount recovered is unknown.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.