YIEDL Smart Contract Redeem Vulnerability

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YiedlAI Logo/Homepage

Yiedl.ai is a platform offering access to different yield strategies, prepared by a competing council of data scientists. The platform initiatied a Y-BULL strategy, which had a vulnerability in the redeem function, allowing an attacker to exploit $157k from the smart contract. The lost funds are reportedly all company funds of Yiedl.ai, and not user funds. The protocol acknowledged the attack on Twitter and claims their launch plans are not impacted.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About YIEDL.ai

"YIEDL is a service that allows users to invest their on-chain assets in a portfolio of crypto-assets generated from crowd-sourced machine-learning forecasts."

"Invest SMARTER, not HARDER Discover YIEDL and elevate your portfolio. Trade next-gen AI-powered vaults, built for you by a community of +500 data scientists"

"We gathered the best Data Scientists ​in the world to build for you the best ​AI-powered portfolios" "1-click solution to Join the Web3 ​revolution. Mint, or trade Vault shares ​directly from your wallet" "“Not your keys, not your coins.” ​Funds are user-controlled, ​eliminating third-party fraud risk"

"We detected potential suspicious activity related to Y-BULL (Yiedl BULL)."

"According to intelligence from the SlowMist Security Team, the YIEDL project on the BSC chain was attacked, with the attacker stealing approximately $300,000. In this incident, the reason lies in the contract’s failure to adequately validate the external parameter(dataList) provided by the user during the processing of the redeem function call. This parameter is critical data for controlling asset exchanges, typically containing specific transaction instructions or routing information. The attacker maliciously constructed this external parameter, enabling unauthorized asset transfers."

"The vulnerable and exploited Y-BULL (Yiedl BULL) contract has a redeem function that allows users to exchange a specific number of shares they hold in an asset pool for a certain asset."

"The dataList parameter is used to make external calls to control asset exchange with information relating to transactions or other routing details. Due to a lack of validation in this parameter, the attacker was able to inject payloads that led to unintentioned interactions with the router contracts, leading to unauthorized asset transfers."

"The attacker repeatedly invoked a call to this redeem function, passing the `sharesToRedeem` parameter as zero."

"Hello Yiedl community, as you already know, a few days ago we suffered a hard blow on the BSC Y-BULL vault.

1. Fortunately, the funds involved in the hack are not funds belonging to community users but are company funds.

2. Funds held in other vaults (UP<DOWN, NEUTRAL) were not affected by this incident and are safe.

3. Meanwhile, investigations are still ongoing (internal and with the relevant authorities) and we will publish an incident report as soon as possible. Together with our partners we are trying to shed light on the responsibilities of all the actors involved (external auditor, internal team, end users) and we will share everything with maximum transparency.

4. As far as the project is concerned, everything remains unchanged. The competition continues without interruption"

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - YIEDL Smart Contract Redeem Vulnerability

Date	Event	Description
April 23rd, 2024 7:24:43 PM MDT	Suspicious Transaction	The suspicious transaction happens on the blockchain.
April 23rd, 2024 8:33:00 PM MDT	PeckShield Alert	PeckShield posts an alerta about the exploit, attributing the amount lost as $160k.
April 23rd, 2024 8:38:00 PM MDT	SlowMist Tweet	The SlowMist team tweets about the vulnerability which they detected from the suspicious transaction.
April 26th, 2024 12:29:22 AM MDT	Neptune Mutual Analysis	Neptune Mutual publishes an analysis of the exploit, which they would share on Twitter several hours later.
April 29th, 2024 5:21:00 AM MDT	Yiedl Team Tweet	The Yiedl team posts a tweet update which acknowledges the incident and reports that no user funds were lost. All lost funds were company funds. Their project will continue without any effect.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount at risk has been estimated at $300,000 USD. The total amount lost has been estimated at $157,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.