XBridge Suspicious Transactions
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XBridge is an innovative cross-chain bridging platform with very catchy marketing videos. On April 24th, coincident with Twitter promotions, the protocol suffered an exploit which drained over $1m worth of value. The website appears to have subsequently displayed a maintenance page. There don't appear to be any updates showing up on Twitter.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21]
About XBridge
"Step into the world of cutting-edge innovation!" "Saitama is proud to introduce you to the next generation of blockchain technology- XBridge."
"Unlock the limitless power of blockchain and reshape your trading and investment game like never before"
"Make the smoothest transfers possible at lower premium transaction costs, across multiple blockchains!"
"The cross-chain bridge X Bridge has experienced multiple suspicious transactions, which are still ongoing. A suspicious address was recently funded by Tornado Cash on BNBChain, then bridged to ETH, and subsequently deposited 0.15 ETH into 'OwnedUpgradeabilityProxy.' Shortly after, a withdrawal of 482M STC totaling $824K was made from your 'OwnedUpgradeabilityProxy' contract."
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| February 1st, 2024 2:03:00 AM MST | Website Maintenance | The XBridge webstie undergoes maintenance, which appears to be unrelated to the incident. |
| March 29th, 2024 4:35:52 AM MDT | XBridge Website Capture | The last capture of the XBridge webstie being online prior to the exploit. |
| April 24th, 2024 1:15:47 AM MDT | Malicious Contract Creation | The creation of the malicious contract. |
| April 24th, 2024 1:19:35 AM MDT | First Exploit Transaction | The very first exploit transaction on the XBridge protocol. |
| April 24th, 2024 1:28:00 AM MDT | Limitless Potential | XBridge posts a promotional tweet, instructing users to "[d]iscover limitless potential with XBridge", the "innovative cross-chain platform [which] opens doors to new markets, unlocks asset advantages, and leads in liquidity". This appears to be their last tweet prior to the incident. |
| April 24th, 2024 1:39:35 AM MDT | Exploit Transaction | A second exploit transaction on the Ethereum chain to drain 1,372,522,850.794421868 SRLTY tokens, worth $186k. |
| April 24th, 2024 2:09:00 AM MDT | Cyvers Alert Tweet | Cyvers publishes an alerta about the suspicious transactions. |
| April 24th, 2024 2:15:45 AM MDT | PANewsLab Article | PANewsLab publishes an article about the exploit (in Chinese) based on the tweet. |
| May 15th, 2024 11:30:44 AM MDT | Website Offline Capture | A capture is taken of the website being offline. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $1,011,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone (May 13, 2024)
- ↑ Cyvers Alerts:X Bridge项目疑似被攻击,目前损失约82.4万美元 - PANews (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @CyversAlerts Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ XBridge (May 15, 2020)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ Under Maintenance (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ @XBridge_ Twitter (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ Address 0x0cfc28d16d07219249c6d6d6ae24e7132ee4caa7 | Etherscan (May 15, 2024)
- ↑ Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan (May 15, 2024)