AllCrypt WordPress Exploit Theft
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It’s always fascinating to hear about an essentially anonymous exchange operator who secured the exchange only with Wordpress, taunted hackers on Twitter, and then was rude to customers after the fact. Luckily, this exchange didn’t achieve any significant volume, which is not surprising. Had they invested in a simple multi-sig cold storage wallet, all could have been avoided.
The country for this case study is not yet known.[1][2][3][4]
https://web.archive.org/web/20140916141422/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/
https://web.archive.org/web/20150322174606/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/
https://web.archive.org/web/20150324203912/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/
https://web.archive.org/web/20150324204356/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/
https://web.archive.org/web/20150324204358/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/
https://web.archive.org/web/20150324210329/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/
https://web.archive.org/web/20150514221118/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/
https://web.archive.org/web/20150324205249/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/status/567551838719705091
https://web.archive.org/web/20150324205250/https://twitter.com/All_Crypt/status/567551838719705091
About AllCrypt
“Ironically AllCrypt tweeted “Too small and insignificant to be a target of the hacks this week. Your coins are safe here because no one cares to hack us” on 2/16/2015 (twitter: All_Crypt/status/567551838719705091)”
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The AllCrypt platform was hacked.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ? | Too Small Tweet | AllCrypt complains to the world that they are too small so no one cares enough to hack them. |
| March 15th, 2015 | WordPress Exploit | A thief manages to get into the AllCrypt Wordpress administration using a marketing director login credential. |
| March 18th, 2015 | Post On Front Of Site | Post is made on the front of the website. |
Technical Details
“Around 8PM on Sunday (all times EDT) our marketing director’s blog account requested a password reset. […] The MD saw this email come in, and forwarded it to myself, and another team member (a technical lead/temporary assistant support staff), letting us know what happened and that he did not request the password reset. I did not see the email at the time, as I was out, and it was not a huge red flag that would require a phone call. Once I returned home later, I saw the email, and logged into the server to double-check on things. That’s when I discovered the breach.” “The blog post goes on to describe how the attacker managed to upload PHP files to the WordPress site, install Adminer (a web based database management utility similar to PHPMyAdmin) and then create fake crypto currency balances in the system. From there, using a fake account, the attacker could then trade crypto currency and transfer earnings to a Bitcoin wallet owned and controlled by the attacker.”
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $12,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
“On March 18, 2015, AllCrypt, a small crypto currency exchange posted what may very well be one of their last posts on their blog. The Bitcoin exchange had been hacked, resulting in stolen crypto currency.” “42 BTC stolen by the hackers” “The stolen Bitcoins might not seem that much, but for a smaller alternative crypto currency exchange even such an amount is not small.”
“The owner, who appears to be anonymous according to WHOIS information, claims that the site cost him a total of $15,000, and further that they only netted roughly 10 BTC in profits after thirteen months of operation.”
“Between hardware and operating costs, I am personally down over $15,000. Believe me – I feel your pain as well. No one on the site had as much on the servers as I personally did. Not that I expect pity or compassion, but I think it’s important to know that I’m not retiring to a private island because of this. I also think it’s important to be as open as possible to assuage any fears of an inside job.”
In response to a customer after the hack - “I see you running an exchange successfully, I’ll take your advice. Wait, you don’t run an exchange? You’re unemployed? Thanks for the input.”
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
General Prevention Policies
Coming soon.
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ Lessons to Learn from the AllCrypt Hack | Acunetix (Mar 2, 2020)
- ↑ BTC-e Exchange Adds Dash And Ethereum Bitcoin Trading Pairs (Mar 2, 2020)
- ↑ Exchange Closure and Settlement - Google Docs (Mar 2, 2020)
- ↑ AllCrypt.com hack resolution. Hacked, stopped, repaired, back up (in 3 days), coins recovered (in 5 days). : CryptoMarkets (Mar 2, 2020)
- ↑ What happened, and what’s going on - AllCrypto Blog Archive March 24th, 2015 2:49:05 PM MDT (Accessed Feb 28, 2024)