MetaMask Wallet Funds Taken anonymizeme

Notice: This page is a freshly imported case study from the original repository. The original content was in a different format, and may not have relevant information for all sections. Please help restructure the content by moving information from the 'About' and 'General Prevention' sections to other sections, and add any missing information or sources you can find. If you are new here, please read General Tutorial on Wikis or Anatomy of a Case Study for help getting started.

Notice: This page contains sources which are not attributed to any text. The unattributed sources follow the initial description. Please assist by visiting each source, reviewing the content, and placing that reference next to any text it can be used to support. Feel free to add any information that you come across which isn't present already. Sources which don't contain any relevant information can be removed. Broken links can be replaced with versions from the Internet Archive. See General Tutorial on Wikis, Anatomy of a Case Study, and/or Citing Your Sources Guide for additional information. Thanks for your help!

MetaMask

Reddit user anonymizeme used MyEtherWallet to set up their wallet, storing the seed phrase at the time on the Evernote cloud storage service. The seed phrase was then imported to MetaMask and wallets were generated on BNB (Binance Smart Chain) and FTM (Fantom) using the same private key.

After breaching the Evernote account, most likely through finding the username and password in a previously breached database, the hacker was able to obtain the seed phrase, derive the BNB and FTM wallets, and retrieve those funds.

The total tokens taken were 235.91 BNB, 1 Wrapped Ethereum, 1,853.73 Fantom, 110,455.80 KnightSwap Token, 3,336.39 Knight LP, and 17,372.10 Undead Finance Tokens. The total value is $196,649.10 when using 0.1062 for Undead Finance, no value for the Knight LP, and closing market values of December 14th, 2021 for all other tokens.

Fortunately for anonymizeme, the hacker was incredible careless and brought the funds to a wallet with a KYC/account link to Binance, Houbi, and OpenSea. They don't appear to have taken any effort to obscure the funds.

As such, when the Reddit community became aware and started investigating, the thief got incredibly scared and return some BNB. Over 236 BNB was returned to the original wallet, worth $120650.30 using the closing market price on December 14th, 2021. The remaining loss to anonymizeme is $75998.85003.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About MetaMask

"It was Metamask." "Mac." "I stupidly did not" "have [my MetaMask] linked to a ledger."

MetaMask is a "crypto wallet & gateway to blockchain apps. Start exploring blockchain applications in seconds. Trusted by over 21 million users worldwide." "Available as a browser extension and as a mobile app, MetaMask equips you with a key vault, secure login, token wallet, and token exchange—everything you need to manage your digital assets."

"My wallet has been hacked- it's adding up to about a $175k loss (not including appreciation later)... trying to figure out how they got access, but is there anyway to track this person down?"

"I'm not sure - I got an email saying an Android logged into my Evernote. I immediately started moving stuff but didn't realize MEW was connected to BNB. I now have 2FA on Evernote too - didn't realize that was an option." "I checked the IP and it looked like a spoofed one."

"They got access to my Evernote which had MyEtherWallet details on it. I caught it and immediately transferred all my ETH funds, but they somehow got to BNB which isn't even supported on MyEtherWallet."

"If they got your 12 word seed phrase or the private keys, those unlock all the other compatible chains. I'm not sure how it works on MEW, but I assume it's similar to MetaMask."

"So, I connected MEW to MetaMask. I thought that was Ethereum network only. From there, I opened up other networks - BNB, AVAX, etc, and thought that was different than the original MEW."

"Well, I didn't realize it and didn't think MEW connected to BNB. I caught it and moved my ETH stuff immediately. But yes - highly stupid me."

"From evernote they got seed From seed they got both pvt key and public key They check etherscan/bscscan etc for assets related to public key. Since they have pvt key they can drain them all!"

"From what I've seen in other comments, OP had 175k worth of crypto stored in a Metamask wallet, where the seed phrase was stored online via Evernote. Probably had their Evernote credentials leaked in one of the various data leaks, an attacker gained access to their Evernote account and hence their Metamask seed phrase, and then gained access to their crypto."

"Hardware wallet won't save you if you keep your seeds in Evernote and if understood correctly that's how OP's funds were stolen." "It wouldn’t have helped in this case because OP got hacked because he was storing his private keys in Evernote which had 3 security breaches in the past 2 years. A hardware wallet is useless if you’re just going to throw your private keys on the cloud anyway."

"[I] was thinking it was a malicious smart contract. That's even worse...175k pasted on Evernote...ffs might as well put there their bank details and pin."

"[I]f the contract created is malicious, it's written to drain funds when you sign it from your hardware wallet then you're screwed. So you need to always be certain what transaction you are signing is in fact what you want and coming from a legit (non phished) website."

"I cried in the middle of Starbucks, called myself a million names, then realized I had to keep it moving. I'm trying to recover the funds..."

"Thanks for the empathy. I know I was stupid. I was staking and didn't think I could do it with a BNB wallet. Lesson sadly learned."

"Your money is still on scammers wallet. Keep track of their transactions. If they try to move them to a CEX, you can get it back. If someone has the time to go through this wallet's old tx, there may be a lead somewhere."

"Hey I did some digging for you[. He's] KYC on binance. From the ad[d]ress you gave us, [h]e [t]ransfer[red] out the stolen funds to [a] secondary wallet. [T]he second wallet got funded for 0.1 bnb 67 days ago. And the last wallet was funded via [B]inance hot wallet 4 times in the last 77 days."

"Make sure to contact [B]inance[. P]rovide them with this information and when he tries to cash out via [B]inance they will freeze hes assets until you make a claim with the authorities, hope you all the best."

"I beli[e]ve I found the Third wallet from the hacker also KYC with [B]inance and tied to the other 2 wallets on multiple oc[c]asions and multiple timeframes (means wasnt just a poor guy who got hacked and drained)."

There's a "transfer from [the] third wallet to [the] second wallet (second wallet is KYC wallet that funded the wallet that holds the stolen funds)."

"This basicly proves that the hacker owns the 3 wallets because he[']s just sending multiple transactions over the 3 wallets on different time dates, 2 wallets are KYC (binance can check if its the same person)."

"[O]n BSC you can see other chains with same wallet ad[d]ress. [O]ne transaction 60 days ago, of HT which is Huobi token, which if [I] read correctly you need to KYC in order to deposit. [M]aybe try to contact Huobi[. T]hey could find the user that withdrew to their ad[d]ress."

"[I]t seems they [also] interacted with [an] OpenSea account, so it's possible they will try to. You could contact OpenSea and notify them to blacklist the adress as well, since they could try laundering the money through NFTs."

"I don't know if he saw this post and got spooked, or WHAT happened, but he returned back 236 BNB today!"

"He hasn't returned my FTM yet, I am not sure if he sent back *ALL* of the BNB, and I am out a few thousand dollars in gas fees, plus the money I lost when accidentally sending DeRace to the wrong wallet when I was trying to move fast."

"I think I'm down maybe $50k, maybe less, need to check."

"BUT HE GAVE ME THE BULK BACK!! THANK YOU SO MUCH!!!!!!"

"OP, if you have the funds back in your wallet you need to move them out of that compromised address right now! Create a new wallet and do that ASAP. Congrats on getting it back!!"

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - MetaMask Wallet Funds Taken anonymizeme

Date	Event	Description
December 14th, 2021 3:52:44 AM MST	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $197,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

The total amount recovered has been estimated at $121,000 USD.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

The primary failure was storing a seed phrase online. Additional failures were also reusing passwords across websites and storing most funds in the same active wallet.

The best practice is to keep the majority of funds offline in a newly generated wallet which has never been online. All copies of the seed phrase or private key should be stored physically offline and never backed up online. Only bring funds to an online active wallet when performing a specific transaction, and return them offline as soon as possible.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.