Arbix Finance Rug Pull

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Arbix Finance

Arbix Finance was a yield farming smart contract, which was audited by CertiK. However, funds were deposited instead on an unaudited smart contract which featured additional centralized mint functions for the owner. This enabled the full $10m which had been invested to be stolen. The website and other social media have been removed. There does not appear to be any proposal for recovery.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Arbix Finance

"Arbix Finance labelled themselves as an arbitrage-focused project on BSC, in which users could deposit into single-asset vaults in order “to gain optimal yield with low risk”."

"Arbix Finance is a yield farming platform on Binance Smart Chain utilizing Arbitrage Earning Protocol to gain optimal yield with low risk." "Arbitrage Earning Protocol takes the vaults' liquidity to make profit against DEXs (e.g. pancakeswap, apeswap, etc..) The profit occurs when there are same-asset price discrepancies among the DEXs."

"Under Arbix Finance users can deposit BEP20 token assets into the vaults and reap competitive profits. Unlike many yield farming platforms, users do not have to concern about impermanent loss since all of the vaults are single-asset."

"Despite providing the project’s audit in November of last year, and marking all major or critical issues as resolved, Certik decided to publish a basic incident analysis."

"The exploited contract was not in the audit scope that was done for Arbix. The project inserted eight `mint()` functions to a newly deployed ARBX ERC20 contract which allowed the owner to mint any amount of ARBX tokens to any address."

"We’ve received inbounds that may indicate high risks regarding to a project named Arbix Finance. Privileged functionalities appear in those smart contracts and we wish the community DYOR enough before interacting with the dApp."

"Steer clear from Arbix Finance says @certikorg after the firm identified the BSC-based yield farming protocol as a rug pull."

"Basically @certik_io @certikorg audited and proudly certified Arbix Finance to have a multi-signature mechanism to approve funds management without even KYC them. They alerted the investors after the devs already rug pulled the TVL."

"#Arbix Finance has been identified as #rugpull. Privileged functionalities appear in the identified smart contracts."

"The funds deposited by users ($10M) were directed to unverified pools via the depositor contract."

"$ARBX contract has mint() with onlyOwner function. 10M $ARBX were minted to 8 addresses. ~4.5M ARBX were minted to: 0x161262d172699cf0a5e09b6cdfa5fee7f32c183d. The 4.5M ARBX were then dumped."

"Also stolen were: $920k Binance-pegged ETH, $2.25M in BSC-USD, $1.7M BUSD, $1.4M CAKE, $1M BSC-USDC, As well as lesser amounts of ADA, DOT, DOGE, LINK, XRP and WBNB."

"Starting around 3 AM +UTC on Jan 4th, the project drained the vaults of users’ funds and deleted their website, Twitter and Telegram accounts."

"Using the platform’s Skytrace tool to analyze the risk of fraud, the firm determined that the hacker moved the funds to Ethereum through decentralized exchange AnySwap USDT."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - Arbix Finance Rug Pull

Date	Event	Description
January 3rd, 2022	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $10,000,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.