BeetsFarm Finance Exit Scam

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BeetsFarm Finance

BeetsFarm Finance made a multitude of claims centered around gaining the trust of the user, and in the end, the only difference between a secure contract and the insecure one they set up was a single underscore.

After gaining the trust and permissions of a vast swath of users, the project used the terms of their contract to withdraw all the user's funds from their connected wallets.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About BeetsFarm Finance

"First Polygon yield farm with auto decreasing emission rate!" "It ain't much but it's honest work!"

"We are first ever Polygon yield farm with a supply hard cap built into our contract! The emission rate of BEET automatically decreases over time asympotically reaching 0, guaranteeing that the total supply will never surpass 51 000 tokens."

"Your trust and peace of mind is critical to us: BeetFarm has been built ground-up with security in mind. It made us sad to see the amount of rugpulls, scams, exploits and hacks that were going around."

"Our mission is to provide the highest quality product where the safety of your funds is the most important. We know very well that only transparent cooperation allow us to create something big."

"As a Goose Finance fork, our base code has been audited numerous times. We’re using the most secure, audited and battle-tested code, to better protect your funds."

"Migrator functions have been removed: no rug-pulls here!" "The Migrator is often used by malicious developers/hackers to steal users' funds. This is impossible on BeetsFarm, as the migration capability has been completely removed from our code."

"We are here to stay, we have ambitions to become a top Polygon farm, we will be honored if you participate in this project with us!"

"Every farm is a copy and paste. Difference is in the approach to the project. carefully prepared documentation, own idea for emission rate, clearly stated marketing strategies and roadmap, answering questions on a telegram, etc."

"According to DappRadar, 289 unique users are registered on Beetsfarm, and the volume of transactions processed by its smart contract does not exceed $245,000 (~£177,390). With that said, almost all the transactional activity recorded by the service falls on 17th June."

"Polygon-based Beetsfarm Finance, a DeFi project that specialises in yield farming, has been accused of fraud. The team behind RugDoc.io accused the developers of stealing more than £86,880 from Beetsfarm users."

"BeetsFarm Finance project stole $100K+ users funds after calling a backdoored emergency withdraw function." "RugDoc service specialists accused the developers of stealing more than $ 120,000 from users."

"To imagine the scale of what the programmers saw, think about the fact that a smart contract gives anyone access to your wallet after you have approved the interaction with this very smart contract. In other words, anyone can make a transaction from your wallet to the project team's wallet."

"The base code of the project also has an emergency withdrawal of funds feature in place (emergencyWithdraw). RugDoc specialists found a similar exploit in it with one crucial difference. Instead of withdrawing assets to the user’s wallet corresponding to the ‘_wallet’ parameter, the function transferred them to the project administrators’ address, designated as ‘wallet’."

"According to experts, the project administration stole a significant amount of money due to the feature of unlimited funds transfer. Through the emergency withdrawal the users’ assets were then moved to the address which contains more than $123,000 (~£89,060) in various tokens." "Users are sounding the alarm on social media, claiming that their LP tokens disappeared right after they made a deposit. Meanwhile, the amount on the developers' wallet has already exceeded $146,000 and is still growing."

"Following the "classics" of scams, the Beetsfarm developers keep a mysterious silence, and the team's Telegram channel has already been deleted. There are only a couple of entries left in their Twitter account, but access to it is also partially limited by the social network."

"There were no statements from the Beetsfarm team following the incident. The project’s Telegram channel was deleted, and its Twitter account was marked as ‘restricted’."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - BeetsFarm Finance Exit Scam

Date	Event	Description
June 17th, 2021	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $146,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

The most secure form of storage is offline multi-signature wallets held by known trained background checked individuals - not smart contract hot wallets written and launched by an anonymous individual or team.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.