WalletGenerator Weak Key Generator

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Wallet Generator Website

WalletGenerator.net was a website which assisted in the generation of bitcoin wallets. The tool gained a lot of trust by being open source, however for several months between August 2018 and May 2019, the keys generated would be within a limited set, meaning multiple users could easily be assigned the same key. There are no specific reports identified yet of users having lost funds in this case.

About WalletGenerator.net

WalletGenerator.net describes itself as a "Universal Open Source Client-Side Wallet Generator".

"Online cryptocurrency paper wallet creator WalletGenerator.net previously ran on code that caused private key/public key pairs to be issued to multiple users. The vulnerability was described in an official blog post by security research Harry Denley of MyCrypto on May 24.

According to the post, the bad code was in effect by August 2018, and was only recently patched out as of May 23. The live code on the website is reportedly supposed to be open source and audited on GitHub, but there were differences detected between the two. After researching the live code, Denley concluded that the keys were deterministically generated on the live version of the website, not randomly.

In one of MyCrypto’s tests between May 18–23, they attempted to use the website’s bulk generator to make 1,000 keys. The GitHub version returned 1,000 unique keys, but the live code returned 120 keys. Running the bulk generator always reportedly returned 120 unique keys instead of 1,000 even when other factors were tweaked, including browser refreshes, VPN changes, or user changes."

“ELI5: When generating a key, you take a super-random number, turn it into the private key, and turn that into the public key / address. However, if the ‘super-random' number is always ‘5,’ the private key that is generated will always be the same. This is why it’s so important that the super-random number is actually random…not ‘5.’”

"WalletGenerator patched the determinism problem after MyCrypto reached out during the middle of its investigation. WalletGenerator purportedly responded afterward saying that the allegations could not be verified, and even asked the correspondent if MyCrypto was a “phishing website.”"

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - WalletGenerator Weak Key Generator

Date	Event	Description
January 23rd, 2018 4:21 AM MST	Last Github Commit	The last commit to the walletgeneratornet/WalletGenerator.net GitHub repository.
August 17th, 2018	Vulnerability Introduced	The reported date when the vulnerability was introduced into the WalletGenerator.net website.
May 22nd, 2019	Harry Denley Testing	Harry Denley was reportedly testing the WalletGenerator.net website and found insecure code which appeared to generate the same wallet address for multiple users on the evening of May 22nd.
May 23rd, 2019	Insecure Code Patched	The vulnerability was reportedly fixed on the walletgenerator.net website. This was reported to have happened in mid-day, prior to the site owner responding to Harry Denley's email. The site owner suggested that perhaps Harry Denley had been on a phishing website by mistake.
May 24th, 2019	Harry Denley Blog Post	Security researcher Harry Denley shares a blog post about the vulnerability.
November 29th, 2019 3:09:00 PM MST	MichaelMure Reedme Updated	Github user Michael Mure updates the ReadMe on MichaelMure/WalletGenerator.net to indicate that the wallet generation code is not safe to use, and links to the Harry Denley's blog post.
March 29th, 2022 9:06:00 PM MDT	Questions About What Code Is Okay	Github user hansbkk asks about whether Michael Mure's code is okay or not, and receives no answer.
March 22nd, 2023 3:45:00 AM MDT	Questions From PhoenixIV	GitHub user PhoenixIV has some questions being shared on MichaelMure's WalletGenerator.net Github.

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost is unknown.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

Generating your wallet using a third party website is likely not the best idea.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.