FutureSwap Credential Disclosure
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FutureSwap is a decentralized exchange that operates on Arbitrum, a layer 2 solution to scale ethereum. One of the users who held over 300,000 FST (valued ~$798k USD) suffered an account breach and their funds were stolen. Details of the specific breach method were not located. The protocol apparently paused the smart contract, bringing their system offline for 24-48 hours, in order to restore the funds.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]
About FutureSwap
"The Future of Perpetuals Is Here. Leverage on any tokens with a protocol trusted with billions for its price execution, super low fees and reliability." "Take full control of your crypto. Built on Ethereum, our non-custodial perpetuals exchange focuses on one thing: being the best execution environment for trades."
"Futureswap is a decentralized non-custodial perpetual protocol where users can gain leveraged exposure on assets. Liquidity providers (LPs) deposit liquidity in order to earn passive income from trading fees and FST incentives. This liquidity is utilized by the Futureswap protocol and other automated market makers (AMMs) under the hood to create leveraged exposure. Realistically, Futureswap operates as a lending protocol as no leverage contracts are being created but only LPs lending funds while holding collateral."
"Take full advantage of everything Layer 2 has to offer. Say goodbye to eye-watering gas fees. Get your money in an instant with superfast withdrawals. Stay completely secure with optimistic rollups. Execute your trades instantly. Trade from any device. Gain leveraged exposure on limitless assets."
"We have all been in this industry too long not to make the security of your funds our absolute top priority. That’s why, so far, we’ve spent upwards of $450k on audits from Open Zeppelin and Trail of Bits, as well as code reviews from white hats."
"The credentials for [a FutureSwap] account were compromised by human error, and the attacker was able to gain access on Arbitrum and transfer the available reward FST to himself."
"Decentralized derivatives trading platform FutureSwap tweeted that an account with around 300,000 FST reward reserves (0.3% of supply) was compromised yesterday." "Last night, an account with access to a reserve of ~300,000 FST for rewards (0.3% of the supply) was compromised."
"We took action to remove control of the compromised FST by migrating the FST contract on Arbitrum." "Mainnet FST is unaffected. Arbitrum FST has been redeployed to the state before the withdrawal using a new contract." "Currently Arbitrum FST has used the new contract to take control of the compromised FST, the FST Arbitrum bridge is currently disabled and is scheduled to be restored within 24 to 48 hours."
"The new Arbitrum FST contract [has been deployed]. The old one is no longer valuable and should not be traded."
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| February 10th, 2022 8:37:00 PM MST | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $798,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
The total amount recovered has been estimated at $798,000 USD.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone (Jun 26, 2021)
- ↑ Futureswap (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ Futureswap Docs - Futureswap Docs (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/futureswap/ (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ @futureswapx Twitter (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ @futureswapx Twitter (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ Futureswap Token (FST) Token Tracker | Arbiscan (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ Contract Address 0x488cc08935458403a0458e45e20c0159c8ab2c92 | Arbiscan (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/futureswap/historical-data/ (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ Futureswap price, FST chart, and market cap | CoinGecko (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ Decentralized exchange Futureswap raises $12 million (Mar 12, 2022)
- ↑ https://blog.insurace.io/security-incidents-in-february-9ba66f4bd0a3 (Mar 10, 2022)