Raydium Private Key Compromised
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Raydium is an automated market maker (AMM) built on the Solana blockchain that enables fast trades, shared liquidity, and new yield-earning features. Unlike other decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that can only access liquidity within their own pools, Raydium leverages a central limit order book that provides ecosystem-wide liquidity. The platform is faster and cheaper than other DEXs since it runs on the efficient Solana blockchain, which allows for faster transactions at a lower gas cost. The DEX UI also allows for more advanced trading features such as limit orders, which enhance the trading experience for users. However, recently Raydium suffered a loss of around $4.4 million in fees from its liquidity pools, due to a compromised private key to the owner account of Raydium contracts. The attacker drained accumulated trading/protocol fees via the withdraw_pnl instruction and also changed the SyncNeedTake parameter to withdraw extra funds. Most of the stolen funds have been moved to Ethereum and deposited into Tornado Cash, while 100k SOL ($1.4M) remains in the attacker's Solana address.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
About Raydium
"An avenue for the evolution of DeFi. Light-speed swaps. Next-level liquidity. Friction-less yield."
"Raydium is an automated market maker (AMM) built on the Solana blockchain which leverages a central limit order book to enable lightning-fast trades, shared liquidity and new features for earning yield."
"Other AMM DEXs and DeFi protocols are only able to access liquidity within their own pools and have no access to a central order book. Additionally, many platforms run on other blockchains, such as Ethereum, where transactions are slower and gas fees are higher. Raydium offers a few key advantages: Faster and cheaper: Raydium leverages the efficiency of the Solana blockchain to achieve transactions magnitudes faster than Ethereum and gas fees which are a fraction of the cost. A central order book for ecosystem-wide liquidity: Raydium provides on-chain liquidity to a central limit order book, meaning that Raydium allows access to 3rd party order flow and liquidity on the order book. Trading interface: For traders who want to be able to view TradingView charts, set limit orders and have more control over their trading."
"Raydium's swap feature allows two tokens to be exchanged quickly within liquidity pools, while the DEX UI also allows for more advanced trading features such as limit orders. These make for a better trading experience for users."
"Raydium, a Solana-based AMM, lost a total of ~$4.4M in fees from its liquidity pools."
"There seems to be a wallet is draining LP Pools from Raydium liquidity pools using admin wallet as a signer without having/burning LP tokens.
We withdrew protocol provided PRISM/USDC liquidity from Raydium
WITHDRAW YOUR PRISM/USDC LIQUIDITY FROM RAYDIUM"
"According to OtterSec, the incident appears to have been down to a compromised private key to the owner account of Raydium contracts.
Raydium suspect “a trojan attack and compromised private key for the pool owner account”.
The account had authority over certain functions of Raydium’s pools, allowing the attacker to drain accumulated trading/protocol fees via the withdraw_pnl instruction. The hacker also changed the SyncNeedTake parameter to increase expected fees and withdraw extra funds."
"The majority of funds were bridged to Ethereum, swapped to ETH and have been deposited into Tornado Cash. 100k SOL ($1.4M) remains in the attacker’s Solana address."
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| December 16th, 2022 8:57:02 AM MST | Blockchain Transaction | One of the transactions moving funds, suspected to be with the compromised private key. |
| January 18th, 2023 3:45:02 AM MST | Blockchain Transaction | One of the transactions moving funds, suspected to be with the compromised private key. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $4,400,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ Rekt - Raydium - REKT (May 4, 2023)
- ↑ @prism_ag Twitter (May 4, 2023)
- ↑ @RaydiumProtocol Twitter (May 4, 2023)
- ↑ @RaydiumProtocol Twitter (May 4, 2023)
- ↑ SolanaFM - Solana Explorer (May 4, 2023)
- ↑ Raydium Pool Exploiter | Address 0x7047912c295cd54d6617b5d0d6d8b324a11c91db | Etherscan (May 4, 2023)
- ↑ https://raydium.io/ (May 4, 2023)
- ↑ ✌️ Say Hello to Raydium - Raydium (May 4, 2023)
- ↑ Solscan (May 4, 2023)