DeFi Saver Malicious DNS Hijack

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DeFi Saver


About DeFi Saver

"DeFi Saver is a one-stop dashboard for creating, managing and tracking your DeFi positions." "Automation can manage your leverage and protect your position from liquidation based on your input, non-custodially and trustlessly."[1]

"DeFi Saver is a management dashboard for decentralized finance protocols, including MakerDAO CDPs (with features such as automatic liquidation protection), as well as Compound, dYdX and Fulcrum."[2]

"With DeFi Saver you can manage and interact between decentralized finance protocols. By creating strategies you can create advanced actions that will be executed automatically when certain conditions are met. The code is open source and runs on the Ethereum blockchain."[3]

The Reality

While the smart contract operates in a decentralized manner, most users will tend to interact with the contracts using transactions generated by a centralized website. When a domain name is accessed on the internet, a service called DNS is used to point the domain name to an IP address[4].

The Defi Saver project used NameCheap for their registrar for their primary website[5]. The procedures at NameCheap were such that support team members were able to override the DNS of the website to point the domain name to a malicious server[6][7][8].

What Happened

The account of a customer support agent for NameCheap was hacked[9].

"The attacker was able to access the NameCheap account, even with 2-factor authentication enabled, a strong password, and security alerts. Convex team still had access to the account; 2FA was still enabled, the password was the same, but the attacker was still able to access the account, change the DNS to point to the malicious website, and disable security alerts."

Key Event Timeline - DeFi Saver Malicious DNS Hijack
Date Event Description
March 22nd, 2022 Domain Vault Announced The first archived appearance of the "Domain Vault" service on NameCheap which costs $19.88/mo and is still "coming soon"[10].
June 24th, 2022 10:01:00 AM NameCheap Response NameCheap responds that "We've traced this down to a specific CS agent that was either hacked or compromised somehow and have removed all access from this agent. This affected a few targeted domains but we will continue investigating."[11]
June 24th, 2022 11:21:00 AM NameCheap DomainVault "Usually we require a pin code from customer. We also monitor all actions as well a monitor a real time vip list. In the end our [customer support] needs to be able to modify to help customers especially when 99% don't understand dns. If you want complete security use [DomainVault]"[12]
June 24th, 2022 4:16:00 PM NameCheap Clarifies Hack NameCheap responds that it "[l]ooks more like [their customer support] person was hacked."[9]
February 7th, 2023 7:28:53 PM First Event Describe the event.

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost is unknown.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

The total amount recovered is unknown.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Prevention Policies

The issue ultimately stemmed from a single customer support agent being compromised. A multi-signature requirement on DNS changes would have prevented this scenario entirely.

While NameCheap offers advanced protections on their domain names, this service had just launched two days prior to the DNS change, so it was unlikely to be a reasonable expectation that Convex Finance would have already signed up.

Users of platforms need to be careful and double check any new approval requested by any platform against the proper smart contract address. It is recommended to double check any new smart contract addresses being interacted with.

References