Furucombo DeFi Hack

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Furucombo

Only the most intelligent contract in the world would think it's a good idea to send the funds of every participant to a hacker in response to their request.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Furucombo

"Furucombo, a drag and drop tool for users to create DeFi transactions," "suffered a contract exploit on Feb. 27." "Furucombo adopts a permissionless “drag-and-drop DeFi” feature allowing users to build a custom strategy for earning from different DeFi projects. Moreover, it aggregates various liquidity pools and DeFi functionalities." The "tool designed to help users “batch” transactions and interactions with multiple decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols at once, fell victim to the attack at roughly 4:45 pm UTC."

"The attacker us[ed] a fake contract to trick the protocol into thinking that their contract was a new version of Aave. In an official post-mortem on March 1, Furucombo said that the breach affected 22 users, resulting in a loss worth $15 million in 21 different assets. The stolen assets included major DeFi coins like Bao Finance (BAO), COMBO, Curve DAO (CRV), as well as popular stablecoins like Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC), Furucombo told Cointelegraph." "The hacker [sent] funds to the mixer Tornado Cash to cover their tracks and withdraw funds."

"In these “evil contract” exploits, an attacker creates a contract that fools a protocol into believing it belongs there, giving them access to protocol funds." "In this case, the attacker ‘tricked’ the Furucombo protocol into thinking that their contract was a new ver[si]on of Aave. From there, instead of draining funds from the protocol as in previous evil contract exploits, the attacker instead leveraged the ability to transfer the funds of every user who had given the protocol token permissions." "After successfully tricking Furucombo into believing it was a new version of Aave, the evil contract was able to take advantage of poorly configured permissions in Furucombo user accounts. These users gave ERC20 token permissions to the Furucombo protocol, allowing it to perform transactions using those tokens without further approvals." "“Infinite permissions means you can wipe everyone who interacted with Furucombo,” said whitehat hacker and co-founder of DeFi Italy Emiliano Bonassi in a statement to Cointelegraph." "Unlike many DeFi hacks, where the protocol itself suffers the losses, this vulnerability enabled direct exploitation of user accounts to the tune of at least $14 million in cryptocurrency."

"Furucombo has reported the issue to law enforcement and has started cooperating with smart contract analytics service Certora to receive a full audit for the incident." "Following an internal call with affected users, Furucombo released a compensation plan, announcing that they will issue 5 million iouCOMBO tokens to the victims of the breach. Issued in the form of ERC-20 tokens, iouCOMBO tokens will represent the rights to claim Furucombo’s COMBO tokens in the recovery pool." "Furucombo’s hack is another reminder for DeFi users to seriously consider contract security and not use money in new protocols that they can’t afford to lose."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - Furucombo DeFi Hack

Date	Event	Description
February 27th, 2021 12:00:00 AM	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $15,000,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Prevention Policies

Storing funds in a multi-signature wallet where the keys are held by different trained individuals would prevent a similar incident. It is doubtful that any trained person would believe a request was from Aave 2 without questioning, and even more doubtful if the request asked them to send all client funds of multiple clients to a particular address.