EOS EVM Contract Drain Vulnerability

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EOS.io Logo

A critical vulnerability was uncovered and resolved in the EOS EVM before it could be exploited. The vulnerability, if exploited, would have allowed draining all contracts storing EOS across the trustless bridge. According to the report, the vulnerability was never exploited.

About EOS Blockchain

[1][2]

"EOS is a platform that uses the blockchain technology for the development of decentralized applications (dapps), very similar to Ethereum in function. As a matter of fact, supporters have dubbed it as the “Ethereum killer”. By providing an operating-system-like set of services and features that dapps can make use of, it makes dapp development very easy."

"EOSIO is a highly performant open-source blockchain platform, built to support and operate safe, compliant, and predictable digital infrastructures." "EOSIO is a leading open-source software for blockchain innovation and performance. As one of the most performant, customizable, and secure blockchains available, it offers industry-leading speed, scalability, configurability, and the latest security standards." "Block.one is also the originator of EOSIO, the leading open-source blockchain software that provides developers and businesses with the tools to build the infrastructure of tomorrow."


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The Reality

"The security vulnerability is related to the state objects tracking the reserved addresses of the trustless bridge and how they were not properly being undone in the case of an EVM execution context being reverted. If exploited, it could potentially allow an attacker to illegitimately drain all of the EOS stored by the EOS EVM Contract across the trustless bridge."[3]

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

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What Happened

The vulnerability was kept confidential and patched behind the scenes by the EOS team. They released an update to the EOS EVM on May 15th.

Key Event Timeline - EOS EVM Contract Drain Vulnerability
Date Event Description
May 15th, 2023 7:07:00 PM MDT Upgrade Available The upgrage to the EVM is made available on Twitter[4][5].
May 16th, 2023 Included In SlowMist The vulnerability is included as an exploit on the SlowMist website[6].

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Release Notes:[7]

About The Upgrade:[3]

"The security vulnerability is related to the state objects tracking the reserved addresses of the trustless bridge and how they were not properly being undone in the case of an EVM execution context being reverted. If exploited, it could potentially allow an attacker to illegitimately drain all of the EOS stored by the EOS EVM Contract across the trustless bridge."

"The EOS Network Foundation tweeted that the EOS EVM has released version v0.4.2, which fixes a serious security vulnerability found in the EOS EVM. The EOS EVM contracts, EOS EVM nodes, and EOS EVM RPC components implemented by the EOS mainnet all need to be upgraded."

Total Amount Lost

"The EOS EVM Contract, EOS EVM Node, and EOS EVM RPC for the EOS mainnet implementation have already been patched prior to this public release."

"The fix to the security vulnerability is technically a breaking change to EOS EVM. However, the vulnerability does not appear to have been exploited on either the EOS EVM testnet or mainnet. Therefore, it becomes possible to treat the fix as simpler retroactive change of the EVM."

No funds were lost.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

"The EOS Network Foundation tweeted that the EOS EVM has released version v0.4.2, which fixes a serious security vulnerability found in the EOS EVM. The EOS EVM contracts, EOS EVM nodes, and EOS EVM RPC components implemented by the EOS mainnet all need to be upgraded."

"The EOS EVM Contract, EOS EVM Node, and EOS EVM RPC for the EOS mainnet implementation have already been patched prior to this public release."

"The fix to the security vulnerability is technically a breaking change to EOS EVM. However, the vulnerability does not appear to have been exploited on either the EOS EVM testnet or mainnet. Therefore, it becomes possible to treat the fix as simpler retroactive change of the EVM."

[7]


According to the release notes, the following developers were responsible for assisting with the investigation and resolution:

  • @yarkinwho
  • @spoonincode
  • @taokayan

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

EOS Foundation Announcement on Twitter

The EOS Foundation posted on Twitter to announce the resolution of the vulnerability[4][5].

EOS EVM v0.4.2 Released!

This release fixes a critical security vulnerability discovered in the EOS EVM.

The EOS EVM Contract, EOS EVM Node, and EOS EVM RPC for the EOS mainnet implementation have already been patched prior to this public release.


"Upgrading EOS EVM Contract from v0.4.1 simply requires a setcode of the v0.4.2 contract. There are no changes to the ABI."

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

There don't appear to be any remaining developments in this case. The original vulnerability has already been patched by the EOS team.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.

References