Curve Bribe Exploit
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The Curve Bribe utility allows bribing Curve holders to vote a certain way in the decentralized governance protocol. The assets were stored in a smart contract hot wallet, and this was breachable. A white hack was performed to extract the funds, which were put in a new contract.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country. [1][2][3][4][5][6]
About Curve Finance
"Curve Finance, the decentralized automated market maker (AMM) focused on stablecoin swaps, continues to cement its position as one of the cornerstones of DeFi and holders of its veCRV governance token continue to reap the rewards."
"Curve conducts a weekly governance vote to determine the allocation of CRV rewards to the various liquidity pools on its platform. It’s these votes that the DeFi protocols are after since they directly impact the yields they can offer to their users."
"On Aug. 12, Yearn founder Andre Cronje released a tool that allows DeFi projects to bribe veCRV holders with token rewards in exchange for their votes."
"CRV Vote Incentives - Get more for your votes! Add a reward to a pool which will be distributed proportionally to everyone who votes for it."
"Yearn security team has identified an issue in Curve Bribe v1."
"No check to determine which gauge the tokens were assigned. It simply assigns all of them to whichever gauge/token pair’s period is being updated." "Gauge address is manual input, you can use a malicious gauge. Funds aren't segregated between gauges of same token so your gauge can drain everything."
Curve "whitehacked the contract, successfully recovering $117,565 or 99.8%. The funds will be donated to a new version. A detailed writeup to follow."
"v1 0x171f3cd87E043539EF64b19121854cd1ab74894f v2 0x7893bbb46613d7a4FbcC31Dab4C9b823FfeE1026"
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| August 14th, 2021 12:00:00 AM | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $117,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Prevention Policies
Which policies could have prevented this event from happening?
References
- ↑ blocksec-incidents/2021.md at main · openblocksec/blocksec-incidents · GitHub (Aug 11, 2021)
- ↑ @bantg Twitter (Aug 29, 2021)
- ↑ Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan (Sep 27, 2021)
- ↑ There's Now an App for Bribing Curve Token Holders - The Defiant (Sep 28, 2021)
- ↑ Monthly DeFi Blood Bath Report #4 (Sep 28, 2021)
- ↑ bribe.crv.finance (Sep 28, 2021)