EasyFi's Easy Finishing

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EasyFi

Decentralized code offers no opportunity to cancel or reverse even obviously fraudulent requests. This was made worse by managing the entire contract from what was effectively a hot wallet.

The country for this case study is not yet known.

About EasyFi

"EasyFi is a Layer 2 DeFi lending protocol designed for digital assets powered by the Polygon (formerly Matic) Network. It launched on Binance Smart Chain in early April and partnered with PancakeSwap for yield farming incentives." "EasyFi is a very new project which has received a lot of love & support from its users being the one of early movers on the layer 2 Polygon network."

"Founder and CEO Ankitt Gaur admitted in a blog that the hacker compromised private keys to EasyFi’s admin MetaMask account around 10:40 AM UTC on Apr. 19." "[M]alicious hackers under a well planned sophisticated attack, attacked the founder’s machine remotely to access mnemonic keys/admin keys and were able to drain protocol pools to the tune of $6 million of user’s deposits (from USDT/USDC/Matic/ETH/DAI markets)." "The hack, which took place 19 April, is considered to be among the largest in DeFi history, with $6 million in stablecoins and 2.98 million EZ tokens worth upwards of $120 million lost at the time of the attack."

"According to Gaur, the EasyFi smart contracts were not exploited and only the mnemonic phrase and admin keys for the network’s MetaMask account were compromised. Following a brief post-mortem, the EasyFi team concluded that the hack wasn’t a result of a MetaMask phishing attack. Instead, the physical computer used to execute official transactions was compromised and the wallets were accessed directly from the hard drive." "This is a mnemonic key hack. The EasyFi smart contracts were not exploited and only mnemonic phrase/admin keys were compromised from the metamask under a planned remote attack which was used to drain liquidity from the protocol. The physical machine was not tampered with, and it seems to be the issue with some remote access as might have been previously used on Hugh Karp."

"EasyFi’s native token crashed almost 50% as the news broke, falling from around $26 to $13.50 in under 24 hours." "Commentators on social media criticized EasyFi for using a hot MetaMask wallet for managing its smart contract." CEO Ankit Gaur "offered a $1 million reward to the hacker for returning the funds in full." "In a message to CoinDesk, Guar has confirmed that plans for a hard fork to recover funds are in the works." "Team EasyFi has decided, as communicated earlier, to create a new token contract (EASY V2)." "After another round of consultations and suggestions from large exchanges, forensic agencies, stakeholders & partners, it has been decided that the #EasyFi token ticker will be changed from $EASY to $EZ after the hard fork." "EasyFi shall rise from the ashes and reclaim the glory that has been lost in this unfortunate incident."

The country for this case study is not yet known.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - EasyFi's Easy Finishing

Date	Event	Description
April 19th, 2021	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $126,000,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

This type of situation is easy to prevent with proper training and a multi-signature setup for all transactions.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.