DeFiB Rug Pull: Difference between revisions

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{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/defibrugpull.php}}
{{Imported Case Study 2|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/defibrugpull.php}}
{{Unattributed Citations}}
{{Unattributed Sources}}


[[File:Defibase.jpg|thumb|DEFIBase]]An anonymous development team launched the DEFIBase protocol, a smart contract which gave them full control over the token supply.
[[File:Defibase.jpg|thumb|DEFIBase]]An anonymous development team launched the DEFIBase protocol, a smart contract which gave them full control over the token supply.
Line 6: Line 6:
Instead of helping their users make a larger fortune, they decided to help themselves to all invested funds. This project was very small, so it was hard to determine the actual outcome.
Instead of helping their users make a larger fortune, they decided to help themselves to all invested funds. This project was very small, so it was hard to determine the actual outcome.


This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.<ref name="cryptoslate-1004" /><ref name="coingeniusnews-1243" /><ref name="defiking0twitter-1244" /><ref name="cryptopenntwitter-1245" /><ref name="cryptoslate-1133" /><ref name="bloxy-1246" /><ref name="0xgokhantwitter-1247" /><ref name="defiyield-1248" /><ref name="defibasefinancearchive-1249" /><ref name="etherscan-1250" />
<ref name="cryptoslate-1004" /><ref name="coingeniusnews-1243" /><ref name="defiking0twitter-1244" /><ref name="cryptopenntwitter-1245" /><ref name="cryptoslate-1133" /><ref name="bloxy-1246" /><ref name="0xgokhantwitter-1247" /><ref name="defiyield-1248" /><ref name="defibasefinancearchive-1249" /><ref name="etherscan-1250" />


== About DEFIBase ==
== About DEFIBase ==
Line 55: Line 54:
!Description
!Description
|-
|-
|December 11th, 2020 12:00:00 AM
|December 11th, 2020
|Main Event
|Main Event
|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
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|
|
|}
|}
== Technical Details ==
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?


== Total Amount Lost ==
== Total Amount Lost ==
Line 82: Line 84:
== Ongoing Developments ==
== Ongoing Developments ==
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
== General Prevention Policies ==
Having known individuals controlling a multi-signature wallet prevents any one individual from making off with the funds. For proper security we recommend at least 3 signatures from reputable and trained individuals.
== Individual Prevention Policies ==
{{Prevention:Individuals:Placeholder}}
{{Prevention:Individuals:End}}
== Platform Prevention Policies ==
{{Prevention:Platforms:Placeholder}}
{{Prevention:Platforms:End}}
== Regulatory Prevention Policies ==
{{Prevention:Regulators:Placeholder}}


== Prevention Policies ==
{{Prevention:Regulators:End}}
Having known individuals controlling a multi-signature wallet prevents any one individual from making off with the funds. For proper security we recommend at least 3 signatures from reputable and trained individuals.


== References ==
== References ==
<references><ref name="cryptoslate-1004">[https://cryptoslate.com/in-one-day-a-total-of-1-2-million-worth-of-ethereum-was-stolen-in-three-defi-rug-pulls/ In one day, a total of $1.2 million worth of Ethereum was stolen in three DeFi "rug pulls" | CryptoSlate] (May 26, 2021)</ref>
<references><ref name="cryptoslate-1004">[https://cryptoslate.com/in-one-day-a-total-of-1-2-million-worth-of-ethereum-was-stolen-in-three-defi-rug-pulls/ In one day, a total of $1.2 million worth of Ethereum was stolen in three DeFi "rug pulls" | CryptoSlate] (May 27, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="coingeniusnews-1243">[https://coingenius.news/investors-found-rug-pull-scammers-and-returned-some-eth/ Investors Found “Rug-Pull” Scammers And Returned Some ETH | CoinGenius Hosts Virtual Crypto Event] (Jun 12, 2021)</ref>
<ref name="coingeniusnews-1243">[https://coingenius.news/investors-found-rug-pull-scammers-and-returned-some-eth/ Investors Found “Rug-Pull” Scammers And Returned Some ETH | CoinGenius Hosts Virtual Crypto Event] (Jun 13, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="defiking0twitter-1244">[https://twitter.com/defiking0/status/1337521147861229568 @defiking0 Twitter] (Jun 12, 2021)</ref>
<ref name="defiking0twitter-1244">[https://twitter.com/defiking0/status/1337521147861229568 @defiking0 Twitter] (Jun 13, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="cryptopenntwitter-1245">[https://twitter.com/Crypto_Penn/status/1337512922680057857 @Crypto_Penn Twitter] (Jun 12, 2021)</ref>
<ref name="cryptopenntwitter-1245">[https://twitter.com/Crypto_Penn/status/1337512922680057857 @Crypto_Penn Twitter] (Jun 13, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="cryptoslate-1133">[https://cryptoslate.com/happy-ending-investors-track-down-rug-pull-scammers-some-ethereum-returned/ Happy ending: Investors track down "rug pull" scammers, some Ethereum returned | CryptoSlate] (Jun 12, 2021)</ref>
<ref name="cryptoslate-1133">[https://cryptoslate.com/happy-ending-investors-track-down-rug-pull-scammers-some-ethereum-returned/ Happy ending: Investors track down "rug pull" scammers, some Ethereum returned | CryptoSlate] (Jun 13, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="bloxy-1246">[https://bloxy.info/address/0x154f0dce06eb0e7ea5d6cf1bc70039ca22b5fb17 DEFIBase (DEFIB) ERC20 Token Analytics in Ethereum Mainnet] (Jun 12, 2021)</ref>
<ref name="bloxy-1246">[https://bloxy.info/address/0x154f0dce06eb0e7ea5d6cf1bc70039ca22b5fb17 DEFIBase (DEFIB) ERC20 Token Analytics in Ethereum Mainnet] (Jun 13, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="0xgokhantwitter-1247">[https://twitter.com/0xgokhan/status/1337516216844505088 @0xgokhan Twitter] (Jun 12, 2021)</ref>
<ref name="0xgokhantwitter-1247">[https://twitter.com/0xgokhan/status/1337516216844505088 @0xgokhan Twitter] (Jun 13, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="defiyield-1248">[https://defiyield.info/yield-farming-scam-database DeFi Yield] (Jun 12, 2021)</ref>
<ref name="defiyield-1248">[https://defiyield.info/yield-farming-scam-database DeFi Yield] (Jun 13, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="defibasefinancearchive-1249">[https://web.archive.org/web/20201211011003if_/https://defibase.finance/#/ DEFIBase Protocol] (Jun 12, 2021)</ref>
<ref name="defibasefinancearchive-1249">[https://web.archive.org/web/20201211011003if_/https://defibase.finance/#/ DEFIBase Protocol] (Jun 13, 2021)</ref>


<ref name="etherscan-1250">[https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc4daa21e66be9c5a9474d163abce895d80e31b85748ce7922c91a605d24c1034 Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan] (Jun 18, 2021)</ref></references>
<ref name="etherscan-1250">[https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc4daa21e66be9c5a9474d163abce895d80e31b85748ce7922c91a605d24c1034 Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan] (Jun 19, 2021)</ref></references>

Revision as of 12:40, 2 May 2023

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DEFIBase

An anonymous development team launched the DEFIBase protocol, a smart contract which gave them full control over the token supply.

Instead of helping their users make a larger fortune, they decided to help themselves to all invested funds. This project was very small, so it was hard to determine the actual outcome.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]

About DEFIBase

"DEFIBase is a poorly built fork of the Base project. There was a problem with calling the Rebase function that returned the current token price to the initial one. The developers failed 280 transactions with a manual call to the price rebase function. The project team muted its chat and pulled 696 ETH from the general pool with several transactions" "made with ❤️ by Team DEFIBase"

"Rebasing is a crypto term popularized by Ampleforth. The basic idea is that the supply of a cryptocurrency can contract or expand based on demand, or certain price thresholds that traders must maintain."

"One coin, DeFiB, promised to be a rebasing coin based on Ethereum that would automatically gravitate toward the value of all DeFi tokens in circulation."

"Unfortunately, when the first rebase was slated to happen on Friday, it didn’t. The developers of the project suddenly went AWOL, deleting their Telegram and Twitter while users also noticed that around 600 ETH (~$300,000) worth of liquidity had been drained from the DeFiB pool."

"Weirdly, it appears that some of the lost funds were distributed back to those affected."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

  • Known history of when and how the service was started.
  • What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
  • What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
  • Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
  • Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
  • How were people recruited to participate?
  • Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

  • Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
  • Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

  • When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
  • Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
  • How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
  • Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - DeFiB Rug Pull
Date Event Description
December 11th, 2020 Main Event Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $300,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

Having known individuals controlling a multi-signature wallet prevents any one individual from making off with the funds. For proper security we recommend at least 3 signatures from reputable and trained individuals.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.

References