WeExchange Ripple Gateway Hacked

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WeExchange

WeExchange was an Australian-based exchange which offered trading in CAD, USD, and AUD for a limited set of cryptocurrencies. The platform operators spent investor funds on personal expenses and in the summer of 2013 the platform was hacked. The exact details of the hack have limited details being reported, though roughly 6,000 bitcoins went missing. The platform didn't disclose the hack, and investors appear to have lost their funds.

This exchange or platform is based in Australia, or the incident targeted people primarily in Australia.

About WeExchange

"We provide a place for Bitcoin users to trade Bitcoins to or from USD, AUD or CAD currently."

"The exchange emerged from its limited (invite-only) operations on December 8, 2012. The exchange is operated in Australia by WeExchange Australia, Pty. Ltd and in the U.S. by WeExchange, Inc of Texas."

"JON E. MONTROLL operated two online bitcoin services: WeExchange Australia, Pty. Ltd. (“WeExchange”) and BitFunder.com (“BitFunder”). WeExchange functioned as a bitcoin depository and currency exchange service. BitFunder facilitated the purchase and trading of virtual shares of business entities that listed their virtual shares on the BitFunder platform."

"Between the launch of Bitfunder, in or about December 2012, and at least in or about July 2013, MONTROLL converted a portion of WeExchange users’ bitcoins to his personal use without the users’ knowledge or consent. For example, MONTROLL exchanged numerous bitcoins taken from WeExchange into United States dollars, then spent those funds on personal expenses, such as travel and groceries."

"Beginning on or about July 18, 2013, MONTROLL promoted a security referred to as “Ukyo.Loan.” As described by MONTROLL in a public post about Ukyo.Loan, MONTROLL encouraged investors to “think of [Ukyo.Loan] as a sort of round-about investment” in BitFunder and WeExchange and, at the same time, described Ukyo.Loan as “a personal loan” and “for private investment purposes.” MONTROLL further promised to pay purchasers of Ukyo.Loan daily interest on their investment and promised shares could be “redeemed at face value anytime upon request.”"

"During the summer of 2013, one or more individuals (the “Hackers”) exploited a weakness in the BitFunder programming code to cause BitFunder to credit the Hackers with profits they did not, in fact, earn (the “Exploit”). As a result, the Hackers were able to wrongfully withdraw from WeExchange approximately 6,000 bitcoins, with the majority of those coins being wrongfully withdrawn between July 28, 2013, and July 31, 2013. As a result of the Exploit, BitFunder and WeExchange lacked the bitcoins necessary to cover what MONTROLL owed to users."

"The operator of a shuttered bitcoin-denominated exchange was arrested on Wednesday on federal charges that he lied to U.S. securities regulators to avoid taking responsibility for the theft by hackers of virtual currency now worth nearly $70 million."

"Notwithstanding the scope of the Exploit, MONTROLL failed to disclose the Exploit to users of BitFunder and WeExchange, or investors in Ukyo.Loan. Instead, MONTROLL continued to promote and sell Ukyo.Loan to customers and, on at least one occasion, falsely represented to customers that BitFunder was commercially successful. As a result of his omissions and misrepresentations, MONTROLL raised approximately 978 bitcoins through Ukyo.Loan after his discovery of the Exploit."

"The SEC’s New York Regional Office began an investigation into BitFunder and the Exploit. During the course of the investigation, MONTROLL provided the SEC with a falsified screenshot purportedly documenting, among other things, the total number of bitcoins available to BitFunder users in the WeExchange Wallet as of October 13, 2013. Additionally, during sworn investigative testimony on both November 14, 2013, and October 6, 2015, MONTROLL provided materially false and misleading answers to certain questions about, among other things, the timing of MONTROLL’s discovery of the Exploit."

"MONTROLL, 37, of Saginaw, Texas, pled guilty to one count of securities fraud and one count of obstruction of justice. Each charge carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge. MONTROLL will be sentenced by Judge Berman at a date to be determined."

This exchange or platform is based in Australia, or the incident targeted people primarily in Australia.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - WeExchange Ripple Gateway Hacked

Date	Event	Description
July 15th, 2013 12:00:00 AM	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $590,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Prevention Policies

Which policies could have prevented this event from happening?