GhostMixer Relaunched As Scam Website: Difference between revisions
(Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/ghostmixerrelaunchedasscamwebsite.php}} thumb|GhostMixerGhostMixer was a bitcoin mixing service launched around March 2018. Users could give bitcoin to receive mixed bitcoin. The service went offline around August 2018. Since that time, a fraudster set up a fake mixing service on the same domain. It does not appear that any funds have been sent to the mixer service. The co...") |
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{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/ghostmixerrelaunchedasscamwebsite.php}} | {{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/ghostmixerrelaunchedasscamwebsite.php}} | ||
{{Unattributed Citations}} | |||
[[File:Ghostmixer.jpg|thumb|GhostMixer]]GhostMixer was a bitcoin mixing service launched around March 2018. Users could give bitcoin to receive mixed bitcoin. The service went offline around August 2018. Since that time, a fraudster set up a fake mixing service on the same domain. It does not appear that any funds have been sent to the mixer service. | [[File:Ghostmixer.jpg|thumb|GhostMixer]]GhostMixer was a bitcoin mixing service launched around March 2018. Users could give bitcoin to receive mixed bitcoin. The service went offline around August 2018. Since that time, a fraudster set up a fake mixing service on the same domain. It does not appear that any funds have been sent to the mixer service. | ||
The country for this case study is not yet known. | The country for this case study is not yet known. | ||
<ref name="certikorgtwitter-5458" /><ref name="certikorgtwitter-5521" /> | |||
== About GhostMixer == | == About GhostMixer == | ||
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Don't Include: | Don't Include: | ||
* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed. | * Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed. | ||
* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event. | * Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event. | ||
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|- | |- | ||
|September 3rd, 2019 10:26:10 PM | |September 3rd, 2019 10:26:10 PM | ||
| | |Main Event | ||
| | |Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 72: | Line 69: | ||
== Total Amount Lost == | == Total Amount Lost == | ||
No funds were lost. | |||
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie? | How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie? | ||
| Line 83: | Line 80: | ||
== Total Amount Recovered == | == Total Amount Recovered == | ||
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case. | |||
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users? | What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users? | ||
| Line 91: | Line 88: | ||
== Prevention Policies == | == Prevention Policies == | ||
Which policies could have prevented this event from happening? | |||
== References == | == References == | ||
[https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1379971240736219140 https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1379971240736219140] (Jan 10) | <references><ref name="certikorgtwitter-5458">[https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1379971240736219140 https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1379971240736219140] (Jan 10, 2022)</ref> | ||
[https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1379971240736219140/retweets/with_comments https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1379971240736219140/retweets/with_comments] (Jan 11) | <ref name="certikorgtwitter-5521">[https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1379971240736219140/retweets/with_comments https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1379971240736219140/retweets/with_comments] (Jan 11, 2022)</ref></references> | ||
Revision as of 11:10, 17 February 2023
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GhostMixer was a bitcoin mixing service launched around March 2018. Users could give bitcoin to receive mixed bitcoin. The service went offline around August 2018. Since that time, a fraudster set up a fake mixing service on the same domain. It does not appear that any funds have been sent to the mixer service.
The country for this case study is not yet known. [1][2]
About GhostMixer
"High volume Bitcoin Exchanger" "YOUR TRUST IS OUR PRIORITY" "Virtual currency is part of the here and now, but with it comes the need to “guard your wallet.” GhostMixer’s high volume bitcoin mixer keeps your identity safe by offering premium mixing service with the ability to handle even the largest bitcoin transactions." "Bitcoin mixing, also referred to as Bitcoin tumbling or Bitcoin laundering, is the process of using a service like [GhostMixer] to break the connection between a Bitcoin sending and receiving address."
"Cleans the coins instantly, you can set the time. After the intial transaction you send to GhostMixer has 1 confirmations, the coins will be cleaned and sent back to you with 1 transaction immediately. The process can take up to 48 hours."
"Unlike regular GhostMixer you don’t need to sign up for a account. This means no entry fee, no pgp key verification, and no link to you (even your online identity) at all. One-click random delay and randomized transactions buttons makes for simple, fast, and secure bitcoin cleaning."
"The GhostMixer system is very simple. Give us the address you want the bitcoins sent to. We give you an address to send them to. You have 48 hours to send 1 transaction between 0.01 and 30 bitcoins. GhostMixer takes a 0.1% fee and sends you brand new coins."
"New tools are being built all the time to increase the ability of the public, as well as private corporations and government agencies, to follow coins through the blockchain and track those who use it." "In the near future it may be simple for anyone- including friends, relatives, employers, and law enforcement, to track every Bitcoin transaction you’ve ever made and see exactly where it ended up. Breaking the connection between your addresses and the coins’ destination by mixing them is certainly a precaution that all Bitcoin users should take. You NEED to use a Bitcoin mixer to protect your privacy and safety."
"According to a thread by @LeGaulois, Ghostmixer.cc domain was discovered to have gone offline this year around March, which means they had stopped operating." "Their twitter was also created in March 2018 and was last active on 22 Aug 2018."
"Ghostmixer.cc shut down their website in March 2019 probably due to no profitable business but the website is online again with the design same as that of SCAM Bitwhisk.io 2.0 and intention is definitely malicious. Probably a scammer bought the domain."
A "FAKE YOUTUBE REVIEW CHANNEL" "was purposely created to promote [the] scam. It has only one subscriber and the video was published on the 24th of July 2019." "As of now no one has been scammed yet."
The country for this case study is not yet known.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| September 3rd, 2019 10:26:10 PM | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Total Amount Lost
No funds were lost.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Prevention Policies
Which policies could have prevented this event from happening?