MetaMask Fake Google Play Clipper Malware: Difference between revisions
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[[File:Metamask.jpg|thumb|MetaMask]]A fake MetaMask extension was found in the Google Play store. In addition to requesting and stealing the private keys of users, the malware is able to modify wallet addresses placed in the clipboard, tricking the user into sending funds to the attacker. It is unknown if there were any users losing funds as a result of the malware. There are no reports of any lost funds being recovered. The application has since been removed from the Google Play store. | [[File:Metamask.jpg|thumb|MetaMask]]A fake MetaMask extension was found in the Google Play store. In addition to requesting and stealing the private keys of users, the malware is able to modify wallet addresses placed in the clipboard, tricking the user into sending funds to the attacker. It is unknown if there were any users losing funds as a result of the malware. There are no reports of any lost funds being recovered. The application has since been removed from the Google Play store. | ||
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.<ref name="cointelegraph-6942" /><ref name="welivesecurity-6943" /> | This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.<ref name="cointelegraph-6942" /><ref name="welivesecurity-6943" /><ref name="unnamed-11522" /><ref name="unnamed-11523" /><ref name="unnamed-11524" /> | ||
== About MetaMask == | == About MetaMask == | ||
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<references><ref name="cointelegraph-6942">[https://cointelegraph.com/news/fake-metamask-crypto-malware-pulled-from-google-play-after-tip-off Fake MetaMask Crypto Malware Pulled From Google Play After Tipoff] (Mar 6, 2022)</ref> | <references><ref name="cointelegraph-6942">[https://cointelegraph.com/news/fake-metamask-crypto-malware-pulled-from-google-play-after-tip-off Fake MetaMask Crypto Malware Pulled From Google Play After Tipoff] (Mar 6, 2022)</ref> | ||
<ref name="welivesecurity-6943">[https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/02/08/first-clipper-malware-google-play/ First clipper malware discovered on Google Play | WeLiveSecurity] (Mar 8, 2022)</ref></references> | <ref name="welivesecurity-6943">[https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/02/08/first-clipper-malware-google-play/ First clipper malware discovered on Google Play | WeLiveSecurity] (Mar 8, 2022)</ref> | ||
<ref name="unnamed-11522">[https://old.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/apazdu/google_play_caught_hosting_an_app_that_steals/eg7dv4r/ normal_rc comments on Google Play Caught Hosting an App That Steals Users’ Cryptocurrency] (Oct 17, 2022)</ref> | |||
<ref name="unnamed-11523">[https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Fig-1.png https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Fig-1.png] (Aug 23, 2023)</ref> | |||
<ref name="unnamed-11524">[https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/02/google-play-caught-hosting-an-app-that-steals-users-cryptocurrency/ Google Play caught hosting an app that steals users’ cryptocurrency | Ars Technica] (Aug 23, 2023)</ref></references> | |||
Latest revision as of 23:10, 3 September 2023
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A fake MetaMask extension was found in the Google Play store. In addition to requesting and stealing the private keys of users, the malware is able to modify wallet addresses placed in the clipboard, tricking the user into sending funds to the attacker. It is unknown if there were any users losing funds as a result of the malware. There are no reports of any lost funds being recovered. The application has since been removed from the Google Play store.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5]
About MetaMask
"For security reasons, addresses of online cryptocurrency wallets are composed of long strings of characters. Instead of typing them, users tend to copy and paste the addresses using the clipboard. A type of malware, known as a “clipper”, takes advantage of this. It intercepts the content of the clipboard and replaces it surreptitiously with what the attacker wants to subvert. In the case of a cryptocurrency transaction, the affected user might end up with the copied wallet address quietly switched to one belonging to the attacker."
"Although relatively new, cryptocurrency stealers that rely on altering the clipboard’s content can be considered established malware. ESET researchers even discovered one hosted on download.cnet.com, one of the most popular software-hosting sites in the world. In August 2018, the first Android clipper was discovered being sold on underground hacking forums and since then, this malware has been detected in several shady app stores." "Known as a “Clipper,” the malware replaces copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with an address belonging to an attacker in the hope that funds will be sent elsewhere without the user noticing."
"The clipper we found lurking in the Google Play store, detected by ESET security solutions as Android/Clipper.C, impersonates a legitimate service called MetaMask. The malware’s primary purpose is to steal the victim’s credentials and private keys to gain control over the victim’s Ethereum funds. However, it can also replace a Bitcoin or Ethereum wallet address copied to the clipboard with one belonging to the attacker."
"This attack targets users who want to use the mobile version of the MetaMask service, which is designed to run Ethereum decentralized apps in a browser, without having to run a full Ethereum node. However, the service currently does not offer a mobile app – only add-ons for desktop browsers such as Chrome and Firefox."
"We spotted Android/Clipper.C shortly after it had been introduced at the official Android store, which was on February 1, 2019. We reported the discovery to the Google Play security team, who removed the app from the Store."
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| February 8th, 2019 11:58:00 AM MST | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
No funds were lost.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ Fake MetaMask Crypto Malware Pulled From Google Play After Tipoff (Mar 6, 2022)
- ↑ First clipper malware discovered on Google Play | WeLiveSecurity (Mar 8, 2022)
- ↑ normal_rc comments on Google Play Caught Hosting an App That Steals Users’ Cryptocurrency (Oct 17, 2022)
- ↑ https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Fig-1.png (Aug 23, 2023)
- ↑ Google Play caught hosting an app that steals users’ cryptocurrency | Ars Technica (Aug 23, 2023)
