SexyAPY Rug Pull: Difference between revisions
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{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/sexyapyrugpull.php}} | {{Imported Case Study 2|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/sexyapyrugpull.php}} | ||
{{Unattributed | {{Unattributed Sources}} | ||
[[File:Binancesecurity.jpg|thumb|SexyAPY]]The SexyAPY launched a liquidity protocol, reportedly audited by TechRate (although that post appears to have been deleted) and getting a reasonably positive review from RugDoc. However, neither of these closely inspected the smart contract, and the creators were completely anonymous. All funds in the contract were stolen, totaling just over $113k. No recovery was provided for affected users. | [[File:Binancesecurity.jpg|thumb|SexyAPY]]The SexyAPY launched a liquidity protocol, reportedly audited by TechRate (although that post appears to have been deleted) and getting a reasonably positive review from RugDoc. However, neither of these closely inspected the smart contract, and the creators were completely anonymous. All funds in the contract were stolen, totaling just over $113k. No recovery was provided for affected users. | ||
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country. | This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.<ref name="certikorgtwitter-5512" /><ref name="reddit-5513" /><ref name="mobilemillionstwitter-5514" /><ref name="sexyapyarchive-5515" /><ref name="coinclarified-5516" /><ref name="coinalphaapp-5517" /><ref name="rugdoc-5518" /><ref name="bscscan-5519" /><ref name="techrate1twitterarchive-5520" /> | ||
<ref name="certikorgtwitter-5512" /><ref name="reddit-5513" /><ref name="mobilemillionstwitter-5514" /><ref name="sexyapyarchive-5515" /><ref name="coinclarified-5516" /><ref name="coinalphaapp-5517" /><ref name="rugdoc-5518" /><ref name="bscscan-5519" /><ref name="techrate1twitterarchive-5520" /> | |||
== About SexyAPY == | == About SexyAPY == | ||
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!Description | !Description | ||
|- | |- | ||
|April 16th, 2021 10:31:07 AM | |April 16th, 2021 10:31:07 AM MDT | ||
|Main Event | |Main Event | ||
|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. | |Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. | ||
| Line 71: | Line 70: | ||
| | | | ||
|} | |} | ||
== Technical Details == | |||
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited? | |||
== Total Amount Lost == | == Total Amount Lost == | ||
| Line 90: | Line 92: | ||
== Ongoing Developments == | == Ongoing Developments == | ||
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded? | What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded? | ||
== General Prevention Policies == | |||
Our framework recommends that all uninsured customer funds be held in a multi-sig wallet by multiple known, trained, background-checked operators. Cases where funds are stolen are typically performed by a single individual, or an anonymous entity. | |||
== Individual Prevention Policies == | |||
{{Prevention:Individuals:Placeholder}} | |||
{{Prevention:Individuals:End}} | |||
== Platform Prevention Policies == | |||
{{Prevention:Platforms:Placeholder}} | |||
{{Prevention:Platforms:End}} | |||
== Regulatory Prevention Policies == | |||
{{Prevention:Regulators:Placeholder}} | |||
{{Prevention:Regulators:End}} | |||
== References == | == References == | ||
Latest revision as of 17:47, 2 May 2023
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The SexyAPY launched a liquidity protocol, reportedly audited by TechRate (although that post appears to have been deleted) and getting a reasonably positive review from RugDoc. However, neither of these closely inspected the smart contract, and the creators were completely anonymous. All funds in the contract were stolen, totaling just over $113k. No recovery was provided for affected users.
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
About SexyAPY
"After the great previous post where he did a x12, I bring you this other gem with the potential to repeat the feat! I have found it by telegram and it is still very green. I'm in!"
"We are tired of all the scams that happen among tokens. So we decided to take matters into our own hands. What differ those token from SexyAPY is mainly the fee redistributed to holders and a very active dev team behind the project."
"SexyAPY is a profitability optimizer on the Binance Smart Chain."
"SexAPY has been audited by TechRate, the contract is safe." "Techrate performed a complete Smart Contract audit of @sexyapy. The report is issued and now published on our website https://techrate.org. Check the contract in the report and stay safe!"
"Autofarm fork that doesnt autofarrm non natives yet so will be redeploying a new MC in the near future. Large project, large contract that calls two bank contracts and an apy distributor. Tons of internal transfers, mints, withdraws, paybonus function. Variables for deposit and withdraw fees capped at 2%. Currently .5%. Didnt see overtly malicious code but dev does have incasetokensgetstuck function in there which can transfer tokens from masterchef to personal wallet for emergency which is good and bad (more good than bad). owner can change bank contracts so dev could technically change and call a new bank contract and if the bank contract has malicious code in it then the main contract could call malicious code."
"Got Techrate audit. I dont feel this project is malicious as dev threw $100k of his own dollars in and locked liquidity but code could [hurt] you. more likely from a bug than a rug since with this much going on and as far as I can tell no beta/no legit auditor on it math could mess up somewhere and cause problems in payout, compounding, or liquidity. No venus vaults. No Timelock. Autoforks have gone tragically wrong in the past so much like deflate, best recomendation I have is to get a legit audit or a third party dev to go bug hunting. Website isnt updating price. Looks like some UI issues. DYOR."
CertiK "published a confirmed RugPull alert on a project named SexyAPY via https://certik.org."
"The project contains four contracts. All of them are deployed by [the same] address. The rug pull happened on “Apr 16,2021 04:31:07 PM +UTC”." "The deployer of the contract called function inCaseTokensGetStuck() to transfer over 519,881 Pancake LP token from this contract to his own address." "Then the deployer transfers all of the Pancake LP token to [another] address. Then, the owner of this address swapped all of the LP token to BUSD. He got over 113,655 BUSD in the end."
"The scammers exploited a total value of $113,655 in BUSD. The funds were washed across platforms via bridges. The project’s website is down but the Twitter account still exists."
"Lost 30 BNB."
This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.
Include:
- Known history of when and how the service was started.
- What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
- What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
- Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
- Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
- How were people recruited to participate?
- Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.
Don't Include:
- Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
- Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.
The Reality
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:
- When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
- Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
- How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
- Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.
What Happened
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
| Date | Event | Description |
|---|---|---|
| April 16th, 2021 10:31:07 AM MDT | Main Event | Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here. |
Technical Details
This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?
Total Amount Lost
The total amount lost has been estimated at $114,000 USD.
How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
Immediate Reactions
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?
Ultimate Outcome
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?
Total Amount Recovered
There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.
What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
Ongoing Developments
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
General Prevention Policies
Our framework recommends that all uninsured customer funds be held in a multi-sig wallet by multiple known, trained, background-checked operators. Cases where funds are stolen are typically performed by a single individual, or an anonymous entity.
Individual Prevention Policies
No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.
Platform Prevention Policies
Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.
For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.
Regulatory Prevention Policies
No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.
For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.
References
- ↑ https://mobile.twitter.com/certikorg/status/1383173629471551495 (Jan 10, 2022)
- ↑ SexyAPY less than 1 hour, 100x potential LIQ LOCKED, code audit : CryptoMoonShots (Jan 11, 2022)
- ↑ @Mobile_Millions Twitter (Jan 11, 2022)
- ↑ SEXYAPY (Jan 11, 2022)
- ↑ How to avoid rug pulls and what they mean (Jan 11, 2022)
- ↑ BUSD/SEXYAPY liquidity pool on Pancake contract address is 0x741ebbf6800e5044d5ac0a7f1921894abae54c54 (Jan 11, 2022)
- ↑ Sexy APY – RugDoc (Jan 11, 2022)
- ↑ https://bscscan.com/token/0xda2ace303531079568e471bb5962d9c7892e2619?a=0x0fda4ac09a12c10fae30e429f4d6b47c9a83c87e (Jan 11, 2022)
- ↑ @TechRate1 Twitter (Jan 11, 2022)