CryptoCurrency Clipboard Hijacking

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The best way to avoid falling victim to this scam is to always check not just the start but also the end of any pasted bitcoin addresses prior to making any transaction. It's best to send a small amount first when performing large transactions.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Unknown

"One infamous example of malware within cryptoasset transactions is Cryptocurrency Clipboard Hijackers. This is code that monitors the Windows clipboard for cryptocurrency addresses. When it detects one, it swaps the intended address of the transaction with one that the ‘hijackers’ control, essentially send that money elsewhere. Without taking direct notice of the address you’ve used, you might not realise it’s changed as you’re about to transact."

"ClipboardWalletHijacker's end-plan is to hijack BTC and ETH transactions, so victims unwittingly send funds to the malware's authors."

"While cryptocurrency has seen tremendous growth over the past year, sending cryptocoins still requires users to send the coins to long and hard to remember addresses. Due to this, when sending cryptocoins, many users will simply copy the address into memory from one application and paste it into another application that they are using to send the coins."

"Attackers recognize that users are copying and pasting the addresses and have crea\ted malware to take advantage of this. This type of malware, called CryptoCurrency Clipboard Hijackers, works by monitoring the Windows clipboard for cryptocurrency addresses, and if one is detected, will swap it out with an address that they control. Unless a user double-checks the address after they paste it, the sent coins will go to an address under the attackers control instead the intended recipient."

"In some cases, it’s been found that versions of this virus have been able to monitor over two million cryptoasset addresses."

"Bitcoin fraud cases can come in many variations. In this blog, we exampled ponzi schemes, fake cryptoassets, malware, pump-and-dump scams and fake ICOs to name a few."

"Checking the balances of these addresses using Blockchain.info (1, 2) and Etherscan.io, we can see crooks only received 0.12434321 BTC from eight transactions and no Ether. That's around $800."

"CryptoCurrency Clipboard Hijackers was essentially a malware scam. Unlike most of the scams on this list, which fraudulently posed as legitimate cryptocurrencies, wallets, or other blockchain technology hubs, the Clipboard Hijackers attacked Windows systems by monitoring the clipboard for cryptocurrency addresses. When one was detected, it was swapped for an address controlled by the perpetrators. Since a centralized company wasn't to blame for these attacks, they have the potential to pop up even today, so be wary of your online security."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - CryptoCurrency Clipboard Hijacking

Date	Event	Description
June 30th, 2018	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost is unknown.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.