VeBitcoin Shuts Down

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VeBitcoin

There is a significant difference between the simple protection layer provided by BitGo and a multi-signature wallet which requires the authorization of multiple exchange operators. In addition, the BitGo wallet was an online hot wallet. Finally, it appears that the exchange may have been operating fractionally. There is little evidence that any of the operators had any sort of training for what they were doing.

False insurance claims are all-too-common. There is the strongest incentive for both insurance providers and platforms to imply that more is protected than actually is, and policy details aren't available, even if one had the time to read through them. It's very clear that this claim would have gone a long way towards assuring customers of the platform of the safety of their funds. It is just one of the many problems with third party insurance.

When things went wrong, of course there was no one to turn to for help, and the government immediately arrested them, cementing the loss for all customers.

This exchange or platform is based in Turkey, or the incident targeted people primarily in Turkey.

About VeBitcoin

"Turkey revealed plans to ban software-based “digital tokens” as a form of payment starting from April 30 in an attempt to combat a flight from the tanking Turkish lira." "Aykan Erdemir, senior director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Turkey Program, said the central bank ban incited fear that even holding cryptocurrencies, a hedge against double-digit inflation and lira devaluation, might be eventually declared illegal." “Cryptocurrency is Turkey’s final frontier. It’s almost like the last safe haven citizens believe is out of Erdoğan’s reach.”

"Founded in August 2017, Vebitcoin [was] a digital asset trading platform based in Turkey. It [had] a variety of cryptocurrencies and aims to give users the opportunity to chart their financial path in Turkey and around the world." "As Vebitcoin, our biggest goal is that you, our users, can move freely in the security and financial field. In this course, our efforts and goals that we have transferred and developed from yesterday to today will accompany you tomorrow. We have an important role in this sector yesterday, today and tomorrow, and we will continue to do so." "Vebitcoin – which had some 200,000 clients – stopped trading on April 23." "As a countrywide cryptocurrency ban looms, multiple Turkish exchanges have now come under investigation with four employees of the recently-shuttered Vebitcoin exchange arrested this morning for allegations of fraud." "According to CoinGecko data, Vebitcoin had almost $60 million in daily trading volumes prior to its collapse." "Vebitcoin is the exchange that supports the highest amount of coins and tokens among the 4 highest trading volume cryptocurrency exchanges."

"Vebitcoin described itself on the company website as the “Turkey partner” of BitGo, the California-based digital asset security company BitGo. "All products on our stock exchange, which is a Bitgo partner, are covered by insurance," it noted." "A tweet from 4 June 2020 said, “Vebitcoin is the Turkish partner of BitGo, the world's most important cold storage cryptocurrency bank”" "The most comprehensive insurance in the industry, provided with the UK-based insurance company Lloyd's of London, was announced by BitGo." "But in a call with Decrypt, a spokesperson for BitGo clarified that Vebitcoin has only been its hot wallet client—not a cold wallet client—and certainly not its partner." Prior to closing, the platform posted a notice on their website: “Due to the recent developments in the crypto money industry, our transactions have become much more intense than expected. We have decided to cease our activities in order to fulfill all regulations and claims. We will provide you with information as soon as possible.” "Vebitcoin also disclosed, “We would like to state with regret that this situation has led us to a very difficult process.”"

"The Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) initiated an investigation into Vebitcoin and its managers." "Following the search and seizure operations carried out at the company headquarters and at some addresses, 4 people, who are company directors and employees, were detained." "Cybercrime police in the southwestern Mugla province arrested the suspects – the company head, two employees and the spouse of one of its partners." "Vebitcoin’s Chief Executive Ilker Bas, along with three other employees, were taken into custody." "The investigation carried out by the Directorate of Cyber ​​Crimes Branch of the Muğla Police Department is carried out in a multifaceted and meticulous manner." "Turkish police have blocked Vebitcoin’s domestic bank accounts."

This exchange or platform is based in Turkey, or the incident targeted people primarily in Turkey.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - VeBitcoin Shuts Down

Date	Event	Description
April 24th, 2021	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost is unknown.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

Our proposed framework would have provided training to the operators of the platform, before allowing them to operate. That would have included multiple case studies and storage best practices that would have prevented the loss.

The backing of funds is monitored over time, to ensure all platforms are fully backed. Were individual events to happen, we propose an industry insurance fund which is able to provide support, assist customers, and prevent losses.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.