Visor Finance Emergency Withdrawal

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Visor Finance

The visor finance project had an emergency withdrawal function which was usable from a single private key. An attacker was able to breach that key, and took the funds to tornado cash.

While they claim it was not a team member, they don't report any necessary knowledge about the attacker to be certain of that. All funds were restored from the treasury for affected users.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About Visor Finance

"Visor allows DeFi participants to utilize NFT Smart Vaults for liquidity provisioning and active liquidity management on Uniswap v3." "Visor's community is thousands strong and is distributed across a variety of channels."

"As @uniswap v3 makes liquidity provision more complicated for the common man, @VisorFinance allows you to compete with professional liquidity providers by pooling peoples liquidity together and dynamically concentrating it around price to maximize returns for you."

"Multi-signature accounts are not used for all management functions of Hypervisor."

"On-chain option protocol Charm core developers discovered through the Ethereum blockchain browser that the Uniswap V3 DeFi liquidity protocol Visor Finance smart contract was urgently withdrawn 230 ETH, and then the funds were transferred to the Ethereum privacy trading platform Tornado.cash. According to CoinGecko data, Visor Finance's token VISR has fallen by more than 60% today."

"On Saturday, June 19th we discovered that an attacker had obtained access to an account that managed some of the Hypervisor admin functions." "Our hypervisors contained an emergency withdrawal function, to be deactivated pending audit completion. The attacker obtained access to this account and was able to withdraw $500k. We have since transferred the emergency safe guard to a multi-sig." "The attacker was able to withdraw funds from deposits that were not yet placed into the LP positions. The withdraw amounted to $500k from a TVL of ~$3M. The attacker was not a member of the team and appears to have lacked full understanding of our emergency withdrawal safeguard. Stolen funds were thus limited to un-positioned assets and thus the $500k number was not arbitrary."

"We used treasury funds to cover and restore all user's positions." "[O]ur mistake was not using a multisig account for all admin functions of the Hypervisor. This has since been corrected." "Right now all admin functions of all Hypervisors have been assigned to a multisig and as soon as audits are completed the emergency withdraw function will be removed entirely."

"CertiK completed the Security Assessment of the Visor Hypervisor Active liquidity management contract" on July 9th. "This report has been prepared for Visor Finance to ensure no issues or vulnerabilities are in the source code of the Hypervisor contract as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - Visor Finance Emergency Withdrawal

Date	Event	Description
June 19th, 2021	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Technical Details

This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $500,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

This highlights the importance of multi-signature, which can prevent events like this in the case of one team member having poor security or going rogue. In a multi-signature setup, all members of the team must be involved or breached to release funds.

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.