MetaMask Phishing InstallMetaMask.com

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Install MetaMask Website

Users may go to install MetaMask by searching Google and clicking on the top result - a sponsored link which claims to be the MetaMask website. After installing the MetaMask extension and setting up a wallet, any funds sent there would be drained. If they choose to restore an existing wallet, all their current funds would also be drained. This is because they installed malware instead of the actual MetaMask extension.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About MetaMask

"A crypto wallet & gateway to blockchain apps" "Start exploring blockchain application in seconds. Trusted by over 1 million users worldwide."

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

"[A] fraudulent extension redirects victims to installmetamask.com, which is not an official site of Metamask. Per Whois information, the web domain was registered on November 29, 2020. Ciphertrace found out the first mention in Twitter of the fraudulent domain from a user who asked Metamask team about the site’s authenticity"

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - MetaMask Phishing InstallMetaMask.com

Date	Event	Description
December 1st, 2020 10:51:00 PM MST	MetaMask Twitter Warning	MetaMask posts on Twitter to warn users about the scam links which have been appearing on Google.
December 2nd, 2020 9:21:00 PM MST	dcon18 Victim Tweet	Twitter user dcon18 reports that they lost $30k through the fake link, due to their trust in Google.
December 5th, 2020 8:02:00 AM MST	BleepingComputer Article	BleepingComputer reports that users of the MetaMask cryptocurrency wallet have been targeted by a phishing scam through Google search ads, resulting in the loss of funds. The scam involves users being directed to a fake MetaMask website where they are prompted to install a browser extension. If users choose to import their existing wallet, they are asked to enter their seed phrase, which is then stolen by the attacker, leading to emptied wallets. The scam, which is still active and promoted through various domains, has caused significant financial losses to some users. MetaMask has issued warnings and advised users to access resources only from direct, official links to avoid falling victim to such scams.
December 6th, 2020 10:19:00 AM MST	Site Removed	The site is blacklisted.
December 7th, 2020 5:04:00 AM MST	Reports Of Other Search Engines	Twitter user zseano (Sean Roesner) reports seeing malicious MetaMask phishing sites on other search engines including DuckDuckGo, Yahoo, and Bing.
December 7th, 2020 1:03:11 PM MST	BleepingComputer Article Updated	The BleepingComputer article is updated to add additional information that MetaMask users are now facing fraudulent ads not only on Google but also on other search engines like DuckDuckGo, Bing, and Yahoo. Screenshots captured by BleepingComputer and web app hacker Sean Roesner show these malicious ads, indicating a widespread issue across various search platforms. Roesner's tweet emphasizes the lack of trust in any search provider due to their allowance of scammers to run such ads.

Technical Details

A series of malicious websites were promoted through Google Ads, claiming to be the MetaMask wallet. The resulting websites were indistinguishable from the official MetaMask website. Victims were prompted to install a malicious MetaMask browser extension and enter their existing wallet's seed phrase. This phrase is then sent to the attacker, who empties the victims' wallets. Scammers use multiple domains in Google ads to impersonate MetaMask, making it challenging for users to detect the fraud. All domains appear to have been registered through the NameCheap domain registrar.

This is the address that send all my coins to: 0xd1496A9e217eFE592ef0b7F6D391E1C6A160413e

List of malicious domains involved:

Domain	Registered
installmetamask.com
maskmeha.io
maskmefa.io
meramaks.io

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost is unknown.

Despite MetaMask's warning, many users have reported significant financial losses.

Table Of Losses Discovered

Username/Handle	Wallet Address	Time Of Loss	Amount Lost	Assets Lost
dcon18			$30k

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

"According to an alert published by Ciphertrace, since December 2, 2020, they have been noticing “an uptick of alerts and comments” about crypto funds stolen via a Chrome browser extension posing as the ethereum (ETH)-based wallet Metamask."

"U.S.-based Ciphertrace posted an update on December 3, 2020, detailing that phisher behind Metamask’s fake extension keeps buying sponsored ads on Google, which appear when people search for “metamask” term."

"@Google is allowing a phisher to buy sponsored ads on their search results. When using crypto, try to use direct links, and if you need to use search, watch out for sponsored links."

Reactions From Victims

This was what happening to me yesterday, I reinstall my metamask, choose the first link appears in the google search list, without realized it was a fake link, restore my metamask seed, few hours came back, all my coins completely GONE!!! The link looks so alike with the original

I lost nearly 30K USD!!! All my coins lost! completely lost! I so trust of Google search, How could google let this link to be sponsored?

This is the address that send all my coins to: 0xd1496A9e217eFE592ef0b7F6D391E1C6A160413e

Ok now they sold off all my coins!!! [*] off Google

Another sponsor link out try to find the next victims

I don't understand, wouldn't google need to perform check before approve the ads? Please tell me what I can do to compensate my lost.

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

Total Amount Recovered

There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

General Prevention Policies

Never install a wallet through sponsored ads.

Individual Prevention Policies

To avoid such scams, users should access resources from official links and be cautious of third-party redirects.

Every approval on Web3 is an opportunity to lose all of the funds present in your wallet. Take the time to review the transaction in full. Fully check over the balance, permissions, and entire address which you are interacting with. Do not trust that your clipboard or any website front-end is guaranteed to provide an accurate address or transaction status. Always perform a test transaction prior to the first high-value transaction in any session.

Store the majority of funds offline. By offline, it means that the private key and/or seed phrase is exclusively held by you and not connected to any networked device. Examples of offline storage include paper wallets (seed phrase or key written down and deleted from all electronic media), hardware wallets, steel wallet devices, etc...

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.